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As some Americans would agree, George Washington is among one of the most iconic of men 
and one of the most influential of men in the modern history. He was the general that led a group 
of ragged and undersupplied colonists to victory against their colonial overlord, the vast British 
Empire, and forged the identity and character, as well as the rules and proper form of conduct for 
the President of the United States for years to come. It is therefore without a doubt 
understandable that his final address to the people of the United States was meant as a word of 
caution, and of aid to assist the future leaders of the fletching nation in the struggles ahead. 
The Farewell Address (Washington 1796) was at first published to the people of the nation and 
was never articulated by Washington to public or private. It was also a product of long and 
arduous work by many individuals throughout its long path to becoming the iconic work that it is 
now, and was highly influenced by Washington’s second term rather than the first. Containing 
many warnings against disunity, disruption and cravings that the political environment produces, 
it was a work that remains relevant today as many parallels can be drawn from its contents.  
Not always did the situation allow for Washington’s guidance to be adhered to, and not always 
was it useful for the politicians to heed them. Therefore a section of this thesis is reserved for 
examining Washington’s Farewell Address from an opposing point of view where spirit of the 
party is defended as a democratic process, alliances given an opportunity to work in defence of 
the nation, and the impartiality of trade in Washington’s time questioned. 
While discussing the address in terms of its concepts will create a bulk of this thesis, its major 
aim is to help create parallels in the political environment of today and of the past. For this 
purpose, I will be discussing the historical context of the early republic up to the War of 1812, 
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and additionally in sections that require it (such as in section 7, which looks at earlier 
interpretations of Washington’s Address as it is read before the Senate around Washington’s 
Birthday).  
Lastly, I will evolve the discussion of the parallels through examples that highlight key concepts 
of Washington’s address and how they behave in real-life. Such concepts include the party spirit 
and how it is an integral representation of the democratic process; how the identity and duty 
discussed by Washington led to the creation of the American identity; and how Washington’s 
warnings of commerce as a tool of foreign interference are still pertinent to achieve greater 
success in achieving change within a foreign government. Before I can begin with the discussion, 





2. George Washington and the history of the early republic 
Politicians are normal for any society, and thus are nothing unfamiliar to anyone in a modern 
setting. Throughout history, however, these politicians have been men of power that have 
changed the world without being politicians per se—kings and generals of a nation. George 
Washington can be considered to be such a man: he was born a planter’s son, chose to become a 
soldier over the mundane life, and ended becoming a civilian leader of a whole new nation. His 
view of the world would have been very different from men like Kennedy and Nixon, and he 
built many of the precedents that his successors would follow (Cook & Klay 2015). Although, as 
Washington proceeded to his second term in office, his standing became less and less like that of 
a coveted general leading an army and more of a politician with a base following that he aimed 
to please. 
His second term was a hectic one, and his growth into a politician rapid. Many of his ideologies 
were formed in the aftermath of the French revolution, which invigorated some of his radical 
thoughts as he began to strategize his decisions according to set principles of a portion of his 
country. He either did not see this happening, or regretted it, as can be seen from the 
inconsistencies between the Farewell Address, and the history I am about to repeat. 
Furthermore, it is evident that his partisanship was not yet complete at the end of the first term, 
as an outspoken critic of many of Washington’s policies, Thomas Jefferson, pleaded for 
Washington to apply for a second term in 1792 (Jefferson to Washington, May 23 1792). Though 
it is important to note that Jefferson feared the nation would tear itself apart without Washington 
in their crucial first few years, as the two parties present in the political environment at the time, 
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Federalists and the Republicans, drew each others ire as one supported the British and the other 
the French (Binkley 1968: 29; 72). 
This section of the thesis will summarize the history of the United States and that of George 
Washington. Looking at major events prior to Washington’s rise to fame, I will seek to establish 
a continuum through which to explain the rebellious nature of the colonies. I will then proceed to 
a more in-depth examination of Washington’s personal life, his struggles and experiences. 
Through his lens, I will discuss the history of the United States, mainly the events and decision-
making that took place during his two presidential terms. Finally, I will discuss briefly the time 
after Washington’s retirement in 1797, and the major events in United States history that will be 
pertinent for understanding many of the concepts Washington discussed in his Farewell Address. 
As United States history is a broad subject, easily a thousand pages long, I must subtract much of 
the historical discussion and focus on the main issues at hand. Therefore, it is appropriate that the 
base material referenced in this section is Susan-Mary Grant’s (2012) A Concise History of the 
United States of America, which has gathered these major events and discusses them fluidly as a 
singular, interconnected piece. As for George Washington’s history, the main source is John 
Ferling’s (1988) The First of Men: A Life of George Washington, which examines Washington’s 
life from his early youth, through adolescence filled with adventure and adulthood plagued by 
illness up to his death. 
2.1. Pre-Washington era 
While the United States may not possess a written history that can be tracked back for thousands 
of years—possessing only art and artefacts that were left behind by the many native civilizations 
that inhabit the land and not many persistent structures or bountiful libraries—it is not a light 
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history. In fact, United States might possess one of the most bountiful histories in the world, 
considering the brief amount of time in which it has accomplished so much and become so 
intertwined in the affairs of the whole world. Many of us might also believe that we know the 
history of the United States: first the land of acquisition, second the land of prosperity and then 
the land of freedom. However, the overall image cannot tell the whole story, and the world into 
which the United States of America was born no longer exists. Same goes for the nation itself: 
the changes and struggles of the 19th and 20th century changed the country in many ways, and 
not in all dimensions equally. To answer the question: What is the United States of America, we 
must begin at a time before the founding of the states and discuss the people that inhabited the 
land.  
Prior to the establishment of the federal government, a unified nation an unfounded dream, there 
was still an air of independence within the colonial states themselves, and amongst the people. 
Even since Virginia was first inhabited by Englishmen in 1607, the settlers had battled for their 
land. This is best highlighted by Bacon’s Rebellion of 1676, in which a man named Nathaniel 
Bacon used the excuse of poor leadership by Berkeley, the then governor of Virginia, and native 
attacks to challenge the leadership for the region (Grant 2012: 62—5). This rebellion led to the 
destruction of Jamestown, as well as many farming communities due to native retributions. 
While the rebellion was short-lived thanks to the death of its leader in the autumn of 1676 (p. 
64), it showed the capacity of the colonies to explode in violence against British manners of 
rulership. It also proved that there was a divide between the colonists and the colonizers, as much 
of the support for Bacon and his rebellion came from those that could not afford to live within 
the nice, plentiful coastal region which was used by the exuberantly wealthy to enrich 
themselves, while simultaneously dismissing the woes of those living in the frontier, out in the 
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periphery of their lands (Binkley 1968: 5—7). Whether it is a coincidence that the leader of the 
Revolution came from the same region as them, is a matter of ardent debate. However, it would 
not be the only repetition of history that has occurred since. 
In the following century, the colonies would be set underneath heavy taxation thanks to the 
empty coffers of the British Empire. This was especially increased during, and in the aftermath 
of the Seven years’ War1 (Grant 2012: 97—8), which worked as catalyst for the larger events to 
unfold. The increased control over the economy of the colonies, their exports, while dismissing 
some important issues that afflicted the outlying colonial possessions, similarly to the Virginian 
governor Berkeley’s dismissal of the frontiersmen, led to an opposition that was increasingly 
reinforced by British neglect and use of force. Though, as Grant (2012: 100) notes, it was not a 
predetermined path to revolution, but merely an awakening call to many great people that rose to 
the occasion to fight for that same freedom of decision that had bee shown by Bacon’s Rebellion 
nearly a century earlier. But in this case it was not in the form of force of arms, at first, but in an 
organized manner of congregation of elected members of society that stood as the Stamp Act 
Congress of 1765 (Grant 2012: 100), which released a “Declaration of rights and grievances.” As 
history notes, the Stamp Act was repealed but soon replaced by another charter, which declared 
British dominion over all its colonies and the right of the Parliament to implement laws within 
the Americas as it saw fit. It would only take a few more years, but subsequent interference in 
the colonial affairs would eventually lead to mass sedition by the thirteen colonies, and the rise 
to power of a man called George Washington. 
                                                 
1 In the United States this is known as the French and Indian War, featuring the dual opponents that the Americans 
had to combat. 
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2.2. Washington’s early life and first term 
George Washington can be considered to be one of the greatest presidents in the history of the 
United States. He was the man that led the nation during its hours of founding, and was the man 
that inspired its future foreign policy for a century and a half to come (Nordlinger 2001), though 
it can be argued otherwise. Nevertheless, prior to becoming that man, he was first and foremost a 
farmer turned soldier turned businessman, and finally a politician. The following is a 
chronological examination of Washington’s life with a mixture of colonial history and the 
history of the United States as the two are deeply intertwined. The purpose of this section is to 
give insight into Washington’s character and standing for his warnings present in the Farewell 
Address as many of the aspects he spoke of, he lived through and formulated over a long period 
of time. It will begin with an inspection of Washington’s early career and military exploits before 
turning to his role in the rise of opposition against the British. This section will end with a review 
of Washington’s first term, as the second term focuses more on the political aspects of 
Washington’s character. 
Born in February of 1732, George Washington was raised in an affluent family of colonial 
origin. His official education was minimal (Ferling 1988: 5), and throughout his life, Washington 
tended to experiment and learn by doing, rather than serving under or learning from someone 
more experienced (p. 67—71), as he did with his agricultural knowledge, and attempts at 
growing tobacco later in life. His early life, however, was not focused on farming nor tending to 
his vast inheritance. He spent much of his life surveying different landscapes—a skill that proved 
useful time and time again throughout his life both as a soldier and a businessman, as in the first 
he scoured for defensible and advantageous terrain, and in the latter profit. Then, after a few 
surveying treks into the wild, sponsored by an affluent neighbour and county (p. 12—3), 
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Washington sought a position as an adjutant general of Virginia (p. 17). Though he did not gain 
the position he wanted, he did achieve it through lobbying in 1753.  
This was Washington’s first foray into a life as a soldier. It was not, however, one that provided 
him with much experience. He did not even spend that much time within the areas he was in 
charge of. Therefore, his life as a soldier can really be considered to have begun in 1753, when 
he saw his chance for fame and prestige in delivering a royal decree to the French. 
At this time, political issues between Britain and France were beginning to stir, and the French 
were pushing their claim to the territory in the northwest of Virginia. As a response, the governor 
of the colony, Dinwiddie was tasked with giving the French an ultimatum, and if it came to it, to 
drive out the French from the region by force (Ferling 1988: 18). Washington, bold as he was 
and all too eager to gain some recognition for himself, offered his services to the governor. What 
followed was a difficult trek for Washington, but nevertheless a successful one for his own 
prestige, as his suggestion for a fort placement was soon approved by the governor upon his 
return, and he wrote an account of his mission to Governor Dinwiddie, who was quick to have it 
printed to garner support in defence against the French. And he was indeed rewarded for his 
actions, for he was selected an officer and ordered to gather troops for the coming bout. This 
proved exasperating for the youth, however, and troublesome as few recruits were willing to take 
up arms. Around this time, Washington sent a strong missive to the governor, threatening to 
resign—a feint he used more than once during his time soldiering—after he was slighted for 
command of the troops he had gathered. He was granted the rank of lieutenant-colonel, made 
second-in-command of the army, but this did not satisfy his vanity. Nonetheless, this was to be 
how he would march to war. (Ferling 1988: 19—25).  
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Following the expedition and pursuit to gather troops against the French, Washington soon found 
himself back in the wilderness. This was to be Washington’s first experience of war and defeat, 
and the fickle nature of politics. His first success came when he ambushed a group of 
Frenchmen, finding the battle exhilarating (p. 27), and soon after began a building of a fort to 
prepare against the, now inevitable, French counterattack. While preparing for the French 
counterattack, Washington exchanged heated words with his patron, Governor Dinwiddie, in 
regards to Washington’s officers and their demands for higher compensation for their services. 
Washington’s response to the Governor is the most notable part of this exchange and 
circumstances, as it shows that Washington, even while expecting battle and furiously 
constructing battlements to prevent certain death, responded coolly, remembering the advice of 
his friend and neighbour (p. 27). It proves that Washington was not one to tirade when it could 
have endangered his honour and character, even though he stood by his earlier claims and 
position by reaffirming his words’ sensibility. This sense of vanity would continue throughout 
Washington’s life.  
Continuing to fortify in preparation of the French counterattack, Washington received some 
reinforcements. These men were commanded by a commissioned officer, meaning that they 
outranked Washington and thus replaced them as the commander. This revelation outraged 
Washington, leading him to send another letter to the Governor complaining that he would not 
serve under a non-Virginian. This, once more, shows that Washington had strong character and 
that he was unwilling to be commanded around; he would not put himself as a subordinate to 
another. Whether or not this was because he considered himself superior to others, or if it was 
simply a quirk of his characteristic can be argued. (Ferling 1988: 27). 
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What is known is that Washington was an uncertain commander when left to make a final 
decision. Soon after reinforcements had arrived, Washington heard that many of the local natives 
had joined the French, and that the French army was massive in comparison to his. He attempted 
to persuade many of the native leaders to join him, but his persuasion failed and reports of the 
size of the French troops made him hesitant. He at first chose to make his last stand at a trading 
outpost where he had met with the native leaders. There do not appear to be any records on why 
he chose to place himself in this position, but it is known that he changed his mind after a war 
council and trekked back to his fort, Fort Necessity as he called it, which he reached tired and his 
men ill. The French arrived soon after. (Ferling 1988: 27—28). 
The following battle was rather one-sided. The French overwhelmed the tired Virginians whom 
were all clumped up inside a fortress with little to no defences but small arms. Third of his army 
fell in the fighting by nightfall, and the French offered talks. Washington sent his translator to 
discuss the terms and he came back with a somewhat controversial result. Within the terms were 
placed a term “assassination” (Articles of Capitulation) of a French commander; such an 
acknowledgement at the time was embarrassing for the British, and the defeat was now both 
humiliating and the French counterattack justifiable to the rest of the world. With no option but 
to either fight and die, or surrender, Washington agreed to the terms whether or not he 
recognized what the French imposed with their choice of words. This allowed him and his men 
to withdraw safely, if battered. Backlash of the defeat, however, did not fall to Washington, but 
rather to his second-in-command that had withdrawn his troops into the fortress where they had 
been easily cornered, as well as his Dutch translator, whom Washington accused of not being 
quite as fluent in English as he should have. (Ferling 1988: 28—30).   
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Therefore, what we can learn from Washington’s first expedition and year as the commanding 
officer is that he was a very headstrong of character, willing and capable traverser of the 
wilderness, yet not the legendary figurehead of militarism that he is often imagined and 
portrayed as. He was, instead, a young commander who had failed to defeat a superior, more 
experienced army. Behind it, however, his youth and vanity showed: he pushed aside the blame 
from himself and sought to push it upon someone who was not there to defend themselves2. 
After the battle of Fort necessity, Virginia was not in a position to push the French out, and 
further reinforcements pushed Washington out of the position of command once more. 
Furthermore, Governor Dinwiddie decided to reorganize Virginia’s army, which would have 
demoted Washington from lieutenant-colonel to a captain. Therefore, Washington resigned and 
returned to a life as a planter, only a year into his life as a military commander. He would not 
remain a civilian for long, though, as word reached Washington that following year that a 
General Braddock was to arrive with an army to take Fort Duquesne. Eager to serve and prove 
himself, Washington joined this small force and set out for the third excursion into the frontier, 
his second ahead of an army. (Ferling 1988: 32—7). 
Like his previous attempts, it would not go well, and Washington nearly died as Braddock did to 
a stray bullet. The British and French forced had met suddenly, but the French from a superior 
position outmatched the British troops and a carnage began that saw near-death hail of bullets 
pass by Washington and Braddock as both attempted to rally their troops for a counterattack. 
They did not manage to stop a full rout, but parts of the army did manage a retreat, an act that is 
sometimes credited to Washington, though what could also be credited to the fact that the French 
                                                 
2 Washington’s translator, van Braam, was taken as hostage to Quebec during the prisoner exchange promised in the 
Articles of Capitulation, and would not return to Virginia in years. 
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did not give chase. Later, long after the battle was over, Washington rode along the lines 
gathering remnants of the army until he passed out from exhaustion. (Ferling 1988: 37—9). 
This was to be the second defeat for Washington in as many years, and his service period was 
coming to its end. After spending so much time in soldiering, his plantation and home had fallen 
to destitute, and he had yet to prove himself in war. As such it was not a surprise that the chaos 
of Braddock’s expedition would not be Washington’s last. After returning home, Washington 
was given command of Virginia’s forces by Governor Dinwiddie, and he continued his life as a 
soldier for a few more years. This appointment showed a pragmatic side to Washington’s 
character, as he was willing to accept a compromise: he accepted the command, but he would not 
be given free appointment of officers. Being a commander would not be an easy task, and 
Washington tackled the political side of an army commander with many stumbles, even 
receiving a harsh reprimand from the Governor (Ferling 1988: 50). He also failed to achieve a 
royal commission, which threatened his position of command, for any higher ranked colonial 
officer might take charge of him and his troops. Such did not occur, however, and his service 
ended in a success: Following the British General Forbes, Washington campaigned once more 
against Fort Duquesne and accomplished in pushing the French out of the Ohio in 1758. 
Following this victory, and the end of the French threat against Virginia, Washington married 
and retired from service the following year. (Ferling 1988: 40—60).  
Marriage saw the end of Washington’s life as a soldier and a new life for him began as a planter 
and a businessman, at least for the time being. By now he had also some experience in 
politicking. He had not only attempted some manoeuvres during his appointment as the 
commander of Virginia’s army, which had not been all too successful, but achieved a post in the 
Burgess, in which served until the Revolution. He was not a very vocal politician, mostly using 
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the post to protect his investments and to acquire more wealth (Ferling 1988: 87), and as such his 
life as a planter and businessman surpasses that aspect of his life during this time between 1759 
and late 1760s, when Washington would take a more prominent post in speaking for the 
American identity and freedoms. He spoke against British taxation and the means by which the 
British sought to overrule local administrations. Whether or not this was because Washington’s 
self-interests were threatened by Britain’s approach, or because he was a proponent of the 
American system is not known. (Ferling 1988: 57—101).  
After retiring from the army, Washington tried his hand in growing tobacco. He failed many 
times to produce good crop, and felt swindled by his agents in Britain as he received lower than 
average price for his tobacco. For these reasons, and after finally accepting that Mount Vernon 
would not grow good tobacco, though still in public disputing the blame, Washington moved 
onto growing wheat (Ferling 1988: 66—67). This proved beneficial for him in the long term, as 
British importation taxation did not harm his business to the extent it did for other planters in the 
region. This could be read as a sign of Washington’s commitment to American ideals and 
support the rationale that he fought for independence rather than himself when voting in the 
Burgess against the British implemented measures. However, more than likely it proves that 
Washington would not linger in failure, and would rather experiment with new things, such as he 
did when attempting to grow better tobacco and grain. As a characteristic of Washington, it is 
most important to note that he always preferred to move forwards rather than linger in the past. 
This was evident in his dealings with the British, as he was more than willing to let go of past 
enmities for the sake of survival. (Ferling 1988: 67, 93).  
During his time at the farm, Washington gained prestige, wealth and fame as his name was not 
only recognized due to the military action of his youth, but also because of his fortune that he 
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had amassed in almost two decades since. He was now also a shrewd politician. Though less 
vocal than others, his occasional and on-point speeches gave him an air of level-headedness and 
responsibility amongst the Virginia Burgess. No doubt these qualities, his military reputation and 
resistance against the British taxation—a response to dealing with the debt garnered over the 
Seven Years’ War—got him chosen to represent Virginia in the First Continental Congress. 
Little headway was made during this first convention as delegations from different parts of the 
colonies relied differently on the British export-market. Only a slight nonimportation settled was 
agreed upon, while a non-exportation clause was pushed to the next year, if the matter was not 
resolved by then. (Ferling 1988: 100; 105—7). 
While the next chapter in Washington’s life is one of his most exciting ones, it is too massive to 
fully explore within this thesis. As such, I propose that you learn of Washington’s further martial 
challenges and accomplishments, while I treat them with insufficient breadth and concise them to 
these few aspects: self-care and war of attrition. By self-care, I mean Washington’s handling of 
his own army and its morale. By war of attrition, I mean Washington’s strategy to maintain an 
army, rather than waste it in a needless squabble. 
Before Washington could prove himself in war, and become the man most remember him as, he 
first had to gain command of the continental army. In short, in the second meeting of the 
continental congress, after the first shots of war had been fired in Lexington and Concord, he was 
elected to become the head of the Continental Army due to his prior military service and known 
qualities, a de facto leader of all things in defence of the colonies (Ferling 1988: 112—3). During 
his service as the head of the Continental army, he moved on to develop the army’s officer corp. 
and hygiene practices (p. 141). He was still controversial in some aspects of his command, for 
instance in cutting the salary of enlisted men, while lobbying for a raise for the officers (p. 138). 
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He remained with his troops throughout the first winter, showing a sign of chance from his time 
as a military commander two decades earlier when he spent majority of his time away from the 
troops. He did also drastically improve the army’s discipline, which had been lacklustre during 
Artemys Ward’s command (Ferling 1988: 123—35).  
His following career as a military officer was full of successes and failures, but nevertheless, he 
conquered the enemy through attrition. Grant (2012) notes that while Washington may have been 
rather pessimistic about the support he gained throughout the war, the supporters of 
independence were in the majority, and only a portion allied themselves with the British reason 
(p. 127—8). The British could not hold on to the rebellious colonies, while allowing their own 
economy to shatter, especially after France moved to aid the colonies in spite of their former 
hostilities. While the war continued, it eventually ended in the peace of Paris in 1783 (Grant 
2012: 129). 
After Washington’s military career, he spent some time in retirement until called upon by the 
public office once more (Ferling 1988: 321; 371). The eight years of his life that he spent as 
president would see him attempt to make peace with Britain, whose vision of the rebellious 
colonies was not too amiable, and to ensure that the United States might stand on equal footing 
in trade (Ferling 1988; Grant 2012). His first step before even becoming the president, however, 
was to partake in the reformation of the Articles of Confederation that preceded the Constitution, 
to restructure it to a functional system of governance, especially in consideration with commerce 
and its taxation. One must remember that at this time period, there was no such thing as taxation 
as we know it; rather, a system of taxation was often based on commerce, and the Articles of 
Confederation left the power to command levies on the states rather than the Federal 
government. Naturally, this led to competition between the states, and since the Federal 
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government relied on state funding, it was not a functionally serving entity as it had no means to 
pay away its debt, or to accumulate funds for administrative duties (Irwing & Sylla 2011: 89, 
93).  
Changing the Articles of Confederation was not a simple matter, however. Questions lingered 
about the legality of the event. Washington as one of the main participants and highly requested 
men of the nation was wary of attending due to the convention’s potentially illegal status. That 
all changed when Congress approved of the assembly and their goals (Ferling 1988: 354). Prior 
to Congressional approval, though, two situations had evolved that threatened the existence of 
the Union: a question of control over the Mississippi river, which Spain was eager to maintain 
control of, and the Massachusetts farmers’ uprising (Ferling 1988: 350—1). These two showed a 
necessity for a strong Federal government, but it did not dictate its outcome. 
 The convention was able to produce a draft that was then sent for ratification, and would be 
amended later on in multiple occasions. It adjusted the Federal rights over the states in 
commerce, the courts by establishing the Supreme Court that oversaw the application of the 
Constitution, and of course established the Presidency. It is imperative to note Washington’s role 
in these meetings, and how parts of the new Constitution were as if drafted for him. He was, after 
all, a leading figure of the nation. He was a man that had stood for the Union, and now sought to 
preserve it. It was no surprise then that Washington was offered the position of president, which 
he accepted. 
This will move us on to the next chapter in Washington’s life that is most precious for the 
shaping of the origins of the Farewell Address. It will help us recognize some of the major 
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turning points and decisions that Washington took while in office, and how some of his major 
legislation and policies helped shaped the early days of the Republic. 
The first year of Washington’s administration was quite slow compared to later administrations. 
There was nothing for Washington to do, as many of the positions defined in the Constitution 
had yet to be formed. Similarly, presidential etiquette and power was yet to be established; these 
would all come in time, and Washington knew that his actions would set a precedent for leaders 
to follow (Ferling 1988: 377; Cook & Klay 2015). The new Constitution was also immediately 
drawn into debate, and new positions were formed, each which had to be filled by suitable 
people. Washington’s first year, then, was taken by reviewing candidates for different federal 
positions and getting acquainted to the new position he found himself in. This was not 
necessarily an easy task, as he did not have much political experience. Despite being a member 
of the Virginia Burgess for years, he had not taken an active position in its functions, and had 
little knowledge of the intricacies of law and the tension that created vitriol in the political 
world—an aspect he would come to recognize as a threat. Due to the business of his personal 
schedule, he was not very active in these early days of his administration in driving his own 
goals, giving much leeway to Congress to formulate the Republic’s main functions. Meanwhile, 
he followed his Constitutional duty to appoint people to the positions established to clear some 
of the blockades that still hindered the Federal government. 
The nature of his starting presidency is best described by the issue of national debt. Washington 
was the man to appoint the treasury secretary, and thus was unlikely to stand opposed to any of 
their propositions. He was content to stand aback while the Congress deliberated the matter, and 
then approve what was produces by their opinion (Ferling 1988: 388). For this job he elected 
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Alexander Hamilton, a man that would become a close confidant to the president and that 
established the basis of United States economy for the first decades of the nation. 
Though Washington did not partake actively in composing laws, he did not idle in his spare time. 
Apart from reviewing candidates for the myriad of positions still open the first months, he took 
advantage of this time to tour the country, and to recover from a plethora of ailments that fell 
upon him. Washington throughout his life was a man plagued by many ills, and some would 
hinder him significantly during his presidency. 
Some of the important acts that Washington overviewed were the creation of the Bank of United 
States, which Hamilton defended as a means to protect the Constitution, saying: “it must be 
flexible. If it was interpreted inflexibly, Congress's authority would be suffocated and the new 
government would collapse as surely as had its impotent predecessor” (Ferling 1988: 396). 
Another was the selection of the site of the new Federal City, the future capital, which was 
highly unorthodox due to Washington making the decision well out of bounds of his authority as 
he selected the location without advising the commission established for doing so.  
His motives for selecting the location for the future capital were highly distrusted. While he was 
not directly confronted for the decision, he was suspected of favouritism and personal gain 
(Ferling 1988: 398). In 1780s, he had purchased extensive shares in the Potomac Company, 
which sought to make financial claims of the river, and acted as its president when making the 
selection for the site (Ferling 1988: 334; 398). This was a man that had in the past arranged for 
self-benefit in the distribution of bounty lands that had been promised for the soldier that fought 
in the French and Indian War (p. 71—2). As such, Washington’s decision cannot be seen being 
above personal gain, even though his decision may be argued to be for the benefit of the nation: 
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some argued that the chosen location was to lock Virginia’s place in the Union, as well as 
maintain a direct route to the west (p. 397). One could see parallels in the function of the 
Potomac in unifying the inland with the coastal states, similar to how the Nile connected a long 
stretch of ancient Egypt together into an empire. It is therefore not possible to eliminate either 
from consideration. 
Within his first term, Washington also succeeded in creating an army for the Union. Its first 
foray, however, ended in failure when attempting to secure the north-west from the natives that 
inhabited the land, and whom the Americans feared were supplied by the British as a means to 
overwhelm and subdue their lost territory without open warfare. The troops were killed in similar 
fashion to General Braddock’s expedition, in a quick ambush that left few survivors. (Ferling 
1988: 407). 
Furthermore, Washington’s first term fortified the political ideologies and began to polarize the 
north and south. The political rivalries of Hamilton and Jefferson were beginning to emerge, as 
Hamilton garnered much attention from Washington, and manage to gain his support in many 
subjects that began to fragment the very ideals of republicanism by structuring an elite ruling 
class over an otherwise fallible population. His leadership at the treasure also suggested the 
government begin a move to turn the north into a haven for manufacturing; the south, being 
heavily reliant on plantations and agriculture, was not keen on the idea and the Federalist’s push 
would be no benefit for them. These factions and their bases of support would continue to 
diverge in Washington’s second term. (Ferling 1988: 411—2).  
In the end, Washington’s first term saw great many changes. His policies toward the natives in 
the north brought about a standing army for which he had argued for decades. Furthermore, his 
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policies structured the economy and provided support for the fletching nation. Yet, during his 
first term in office, he also managed to drive political personages away from one another and 
produce factionalism, the same kind of party spirit that he would later cry against in his Farewell 
Address. 
2.3. Washington’s second term and final years 
Washington proved himself to be many things, and highly popular amongst the people. His 
support appeared endless. Yet, one question of Washington’s remains: Was he partisan? For a 
man that spoke against partisanship, he himself did take many actions that would be seen as 
partisan today. 
Indeed, when considering the history of the United States from his point of view, his decision 
were a must. History would not have unravelled in the same manner as it had, had Washington 
not chosen to make peace with Britain for the time being, had his ideals not shown interest in 
western expansion, or had his vision of the “public good,” (Ferling 1988: 417) aligned closer to 
Jefferson’s Republicans. However, even giving him the benefit of the doubt, his vision was more 
aligned with that of Hamilton and his Federalists. It was shown in the leniency shown by 
Washington for Hamilton’s statutes, and to his unwavering push for Federalist ideals in a range 
of issues. He did not intervene when Hamilton enforced his position and pushed aside the 
Republican woes. His second term would come to define Washington’s agenda, and what he 
truly believed in. 
While Washington started his second term on a very brief note, his inaugural address lacking any 
mention of foreign policy, it was undoubtedly in his mind (Ferling 1988: 429). Prior to choosing 
to stand for a second term, he had received news of war between France and Austria, and Prussia 
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(p. 424). In the final days before his second inauguration, France executed King Louis XVI, and 
France and Great Britain entered into a war. He had also received news of the First Terror, and 
saw the French Revolution descend into chaos. He knew that his decisions would not decide the 
fate of the European continent, but he understood that meddling in it may bring about an 
unrecoverable loss to his own (Ferling 1988: 429; 439). 
To prevent such a loss, Washington sought to remain neutral in the war, though this had many 
meanings amongst his cabinet. Jefferson, who had served in France as a diplomat and was a key 
to gaining French support for the American Revolution, and was now in support of maintaining 
the Treaty of 1778. Hamilton, on the other hand, sought to consolidate the Anglo-American 
relations by not following through upon the treaty, and instead supported creating a commercial 
pact with Britain. Hamilton, while unsuccessful at this time to produce a concrete treaty with 
London, did achieve his goals in negating the alliance with France, as Washington agreed to a 
document which dissuaded American citizens from showing favouritism toward either 
belligerent nation. (Ferling 1988: 430—431; Bemis 1934; DeConde 1957). 
The treaty led to deep internal strife within the United States, and to problems in the diplomatic 
front with Britain. Actions taken by the French, as well as pro-French American citizens, to 
change the administration’s opinion brought the United States close to war. To further agitate 
Washington’s spirits, the French sent ambassadors to try and appeal his mind, and then set the 
people of the United States against the British (DeConde 1957; Ferling 1988: 432—3). These 
events will be discussed further on in relation to the aspect of foreign influence present within 
the Farewell Address in section 5.4. 
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Furthermore to agitate relations with France during his second term, Washington did send an 
ambassador to London, but not to forge an alliance. His goals was to protect American 
commercial interests, even enforce them with an accord with Britain that would allow business 
to continue. To do this, he sent John Jay, under advice from Hamilton, to negotiate this treaty in 
1794. This treaty, too, will be discussed extensively in section 5.4 as it plays a significant part to 
Washington’s ideals of neutrality.  
Personal issues were also plenty during the turn to his second term, and in the first months into it. 
His nephew died, leaving his Mount Vernon estate without a formal appointed caretaker. 
Washington’s long term worker, Whiting would fill this position while his nephew was sick, and 
then to his death in autumn 1793. After this Washington hired a caretaker, William Pearce, after 
careful consideration, who took great care of his estate allowing his focus to return to political 
affairs (Ferling 1988: 441; 453). 
In the middle of 1794, Washington was faced by an armed revolt for a tax on whiskey, a 
situation exaggerated by Hamilton as an insurrection and a conspiracy to overthrow the federal 
government (Ferling 1988: 452). To deal with this issue, Washington had chosen to raise an 
army against these revolutionaries. However, to do so, Washington required the permission of 
the state legislature, or a governor’s request for troops (p. 448). In the case of Pennsylvania, the 
state legislature was not in session, but the governor, Thomas Mifflin, had not requested federal 
troops and he wished the matter to be dealt in the judicial system instead of through violence. 
Washington had to relent, but not quit the field altogether. After the rebellion in Massachusetts, 
Congress had given the president the authority to intervene in state affairs “for the purpose of 
repelling foreign invader, enforcing federal law, or suppressing insurrections” (p. 449). He 
received a judicial writ which motioned that all other means of justice had been exhausted, and 
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was thus allowed to send troops to deal with the issue. He himself led the forces at first, but 
returned to Philadelphia as Congress came back into session before they could reach their 
opposition. He did not miss any action, however, as Hamilton’s words were soon learned to be 
stretched. Barely twenty protestors were arrested and brought back to Philadelphia of the over a 
hundred that were accused. Only two of these were found guilty, but were promptly pardoned by 
Washington to avoid further political embarrassment (Ferling 1988: 452). During this same time, 
Washington’s long term campaign against the Native Americans in the northwest had succeeded 
bringing an end to the threat for that region and securing the frontier in the north (Ferling 1988: 
451). This was one of the last tensioned moments of Washington’s career as president before his 
retirement.  
Early in 1795, word reached Washington from John Jay and the treaty he had managed to 
negotiate3. It was thinner than Washington had hoped (Ferling 1988: 456), especially in the 
protections of the American citizenry, and the openness of trade with the British Caribbean 
holdings. However, while it passed along partisan lines through Congress, barely reaching its 
minimum votes, Washington was torn about signing it, though all evidence points to him already 
having accepted the concessions over a bout with Great Britain (Ferling 1988: 460). Political 
machinations would see to this, however, as shortly after retiring to Mount Vernon for the 
summer, a matter was brought into his attention by the secretary of war, Timothy Pickering, 
which in a letter to the French foreign minister Gênet revealed a potential conspiracy by Edmund 
Randolph, the secretary of state, to have the Jay Treaty abolished. Seemingly Randolph had 
agreed to a monetary compensation for dissuading the president from signing the treaty, an act 
                                                 
3 The Jay Treaty (Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Between His Britannic Majesty ad the United States 
of America) was signed for ten year duration in November 1794 in London, but was brought before Congress and 
the Senate only in June 1795, and finally ratified into law in February 1796, lasting until 1806. 
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which he vehemently denied. He proceeded to resign from his post, which was then by a 
Federalist, Pickering in fact. This made Washington’s cabinet heavily partisan during the final 
months of his presidency. Washington heavily denied this partisanship in his administration, 
continuing to call against factionalism, even in his Farewell Address as will be later discussed. 
(Ferling 1988: 458—461).  
This affair would lead to Randolph speaking against Washington in the following years. 
However, Washington was seemingly untouchable by his words. Something that others had 
found to be true. Ferling (1988) notes that Washington was night untouchable, in fact, and that 
“Even his most ‘unpalatable’ acts were sanctioned” (p. 463). It should be noted that Washington 
in his Farewell Address would speak out against this type of personality, and power of one-
sidedness. It will be further discussed in sections 5.2.2 and 6.1.  
In the final months, after the publication of the Farewell Address and the myriad of attacks by 
anti-Federalists and the pro-French, Washington faced the fallout of his actions. Jay Treaty 
which was meant to ensure American neutrality had turned on him; the French had not taken 
kindly to his administrations ties to Britain, nor to his easily influenced nature. In retaliation, 
they chose to work under the rules of Britain, marking the same materials as contraband and 
prohibiting their sale. Soon after, they began seizing American vessels. 
This situation would continue to develop after Washington left office in early 1797, to be 
succeeded by his vice president and a staunch Federalist, John Adams. In 1796, he claimed to 
Congress his actions had succeeded in strengthening the Union, and that the Jay Treaty had been 
a success in keeping the peace. His only disappointments were that Congress had not formed the 
necessary military institutions Washington had pushed for, and that they had failed to create a 
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strong federal army, which was instead replaced by the Militia Act of 1792. (Ferling 1988: 
471—3). 
All in all, this section was to provide some insight into Washington as a person and president. 
His actions during his youth and continued setbacks during his early military career made him a 
person that was both methodical in decision-making, but also hesitant. His nature made him 
unpredictable, especially when emotional and he was easily suggestible by those that shared his 
vigour and ideals, whether this was achieved through flattery or reason. His goals are much 
easier to understand than his actions. He was a man that wanted a strong centralized government 
and thought that a strong military was required for its survival. He also saw the wealth of the 
west, and sought in every step to protect the potential of western expansion, whether it was by 
force of arms or through negotiations. As for his foreign policy, it is clear that he wished to 
maintain a neutrality toward all sides, especially once the war erupted between France and 
Britain. As the conflict escalated and more and more nations were drawn into the issue, 
Washington was forced to make a choice and in all circumstances he opted for Britain; the old 
host to his nation and their habits were still engraved in Washington’s learnings and he had long 
sought the approval from across the sea. He also saw reason in solidifying ties with Great Britain 
and its great mercantile fleet (Ferling 1988: 483). This led him to resisting French attempts to 
draw them into the conflict, and to utilize United States as a staging grounds for their raiding 
operations. It led to the Jay Treaty, which unpopular and divisive, was still the most viable 
option to remaining neutral, while also reinforcing the Union by garnering the support of the 
merchant class. 
As for what became of Washington after his presidency ended, he returned to his life as a planter 
on Mount Vernon. There he opened a few new business ventures with his, then manager, James 
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Anderson—distilleries that brought good income to Washington’s estate. He continued attempts 
to sell his lands that had begun years ago, but it proved to be a more difficult task than expected 
due to the harsh nature of the soil. (Ferling 1988: 487—494). 
In the political side, the second president of the United States experienced a sudden fallout with 
the French soon after taking office, a situation that evolved from Washington’s decisions. The 
French nullified the Franco-American commercial accord of 1778 and in 1797 made the decision 
to seize all ships that contained cargo heading for Britain (Wood 2009: 239). In the end, this 
matter would be resolved diplomatically. Before this was achieved, however, Washington was 
recalled from retirement for one last time. 
In 1798, as the country prepared for a potential, but unlikely French invasion, it passed 
legislation that allowed for the formation of a new army. Washington was made a general of this 
army, though it was not a gracious posting as he soon realized the true nature of the post. He was 
a mere figurehead whose work meant little, especially in the overall designs of war. It also 
proved to be an unnecessary post, as the issue was resolved without conflict after President 
Adams managed to alleviate tensions and the French navy (and thus plans for any naval 
invasion) was defeated by the British at the Battle of the Nile in late 1798 (Wood 2009: 271). It 
would end being Washington’s final duty, no matter how unnecessary, and he still held the post 
upon his death in December 14, 1799. (Ferling 1988: 495—500; 507). 
2.4. After Washington 
After Washington, the United States continued to exist as a nation. Some political turmoil made 
appearances in the void left by Washington’s death and partisan opinions became more apparent 
as they began to argue about the future for the country (Wood 2009: 209). Power switched sides 
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awkwardly in the aftermath of a political campaign at the turn of the century (Wood 2009: 276—
286), some of the causes for which will be discussed in section 8.1, which led to the first 
Republican Presidency. It also concluded the conflict over republican ideals, choosing 
overwhelmingly to oppose the rise of a hierarchical system in governance that the Federalists had 
sought to establish through their policies (Wood 2009: 276).  
The following years would lead the United States to oppose the traditional monarchies of 
Europe, and even to some extent heal their relationship with Revolutionary France, as the 
Republicans supported American freedom of trade fervently in the years of their rule (Wood 
2009: 624—5). This involvement in European affairs and the war in Europe would lead to 
arguments with Britain that could not be solved through diplomatic means and quickly led to 
war. The events of the War of 1812, which will be discussed further in section 8.2 in relation to 
American identity and freedom from the European politics, left the United States with a single 
popular party (Binkley 1968; Sydnor 1946). As an independent entity it was allowed it to expand 
internally to a great extent, leading to issues that would continue to develop to a civil war (Grant 
154—169), the events of which are beyond the scope of this thesis. While I will discuss some 
events after the War of 1812 and in recent history, the main purpose of this thesis is to discuss 
Washington’s warnings through their parallels. As such, if history beyond Washington’s 




3. Previous studies 
Previous studies have mostly examined Washington’s Farewell Address through its effects and 
instigation of the United States’ foreign policy for the following century and a half. Studies such 
as that of Samuel Bemis’ (1934) article, which explored the Farewell Address’ influence on the 
isolationist policies that followed soon after Washington’s presidency are attributed to keeping 
the United States more closely focused on internal, rather than external growth for the first half 
of its existence. Similar examinations of United States foreign policy and Washington’s 
approach to the subject include works by Louis Wright (1943), DeConde (1957), Felix Gilbert 
(1970) and Nordlinger (2001). They all unravel the early political environment in this early 
period of the United States and how the state of the world influenced Washington’s ideology. 
One aspect of the Farewell Address that can be said to have dominated this research is 
Washington’s wish for the United States of America to “steer clear of permanent alliances” 
(Washington 1796).  
Other intriguing studies into the Farewell Address include arguments of its construction and 
structure. It is important to note that Washington did not always pen his own speeches, as few 
presidents do. Horace Binney (1859) questioned the style and delivery of the Farewell Address 
in their work, and concluded that Washington was indeed not the composer of the Address, 
rather he was merely the voice behind it. The actual work can be considered to be a collage of 
Washington’s ideas, organized and constructed by Alexander Hamilton to be coherent and 
relatable. From its structure, Matthew Spalding (2001) identified six issues which Washington 
wished his successors, as well as the people of the United States would reflect upon. These 
subjects are: the importance of the Union, Constitution and the rule of law, political parties and 
their tendency to follow majority opinion, tendencies of the people, threat of foreign influence 
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and policies of trade, alliance and neutrality (p. 22). This thesis has abridged these six major 
points into three categories by combining the threats originating from the outside, such as foreign 
influences and the threat of alliances; those coming from the inside, such as the role of political 
parties and that of the people; and those of commercial importance. It is important to keep in 
mind that they are all intrinsically connected to one another and have to be discussed in a general 
sense, but it is easier to comprehend one singular aspect by discussing it in its primary element or 
function. 
Finally, Gaffey’s (2015) chapter in “The Effects of Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Effects,” 
examines senators’ observations of the Farewell Address, and the many opinions produced from 
reading it. While the study itself is focused upon studying the rhetoric of the texts themselves, it 
is in reality a study about the Farewell Address’ influence upon the senators and a fantastic 
analysis of the differing points of view that arise out of the honest imaginations of those that the 
read the Address and their interpretation of it. It also acts as evidence of the fact that 
Washington’s warnings are “timeless,” and are still found to be true today as they were centuries 
ago. This is not because they are ubiquitous to a singular party or ideal, rather than universal 
worries that can resonate within members of either party. This can be seen in section 7, where I 
discuss the words left behind by those that read the Address and their ability to always find 





The method used to discuss Washington’s Farewell Address will be political discourse analysis, 
a methodology that originates from critical discourse analysis. One of its main purposes is to 
provide insight into “political discourse as primarily a form of argumentation, as involved more 
specifically practical argumentation, argumentation for or against particular ways of acting, 
argumentation that can ground decision” (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 1). Along with this 
main text, I will be utilizing van Dijk (1997) article “What is political discourse analysis” and its 
indications of political discourse analysis.  
To begin answering van Dijk’s question, I already mentioned that political discourse analysis 
(henceforth PDA) is a descendant of critical discourse analysis (henceforth CDA). Their means 
are quite alike one another, only major difference being the core subject which they examine, 
though there is a subtle difference in the way in which they analyse what belongs to what form of 
discourse. PDA, for instance, studies argumentation separately from party opinions, while CDA 
might place them underneath the same bracket of opinion. This works well, as many of the 
subjects discussed in this thesis are not partisan questions, but behavioural patterns that lead to 
separate arguments. PDA is also more focused on the action and use of argumentation to achieve 
a goal. It is about wielding power that is inherent to a politician to drive their own arguments and 
deliberations. It is more goal-oriented than CDA, which studies the overall subject through the 
representation of certain qualities represented (like that of power). Therefore, using PDA, I may 
inspect Washington’s actions, and his ideologies as they are present. I am still constricted by 
time, which limits my analysis to contemporary events. To break away from those restraints, I 
have to further define the structure of PDA used in this thesis.  
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As was already discussed, Washington’s Farewell Address shows a great quantity of political 
ideologies. It is rife with his own frustrations, his own responses and strategies to combat the 
ever evolving threat of war with either France or Britain, and the threat of party politics. It also 
presents his policies for international and internal commerce. Washington’s Farewell Address, 
then, through the eyes of political discourse would be considered a manifesto of sorts. A 
declaration of ideas to represent him in the absence of his own personification. As such, it is 
open for analysis through PDA. To expand this to substantiate the goals of my thesis, which are 
to draw parallels between moments contemporary to Washington and after his time, I must 
incorporate into PDA Manheim and Rich’s (1986) methods for political analysis.  
Manheim and Rich’s 1986 theory for political analysis introduces a six-step process into PDA. 
Its six steps are 1) formulation of theory, 2) operationalization of that theory, 3) selection of 
appropriate techniques, 4) observation, 5) analysis, and 6) interpretation (Manheim & Rich 1986: 
4). It is step six that is most important about the theory, as steps 1–5 are already taken into 
account through the overarching methodology of PDA and the subject of this thesis. It is this 
important function provided for political analysis by the introduction of interpretation that truly 
allows me to interpret, using historical evidence and examples, parallels in policies. 
In conclusion, the main theory through which this thesis is examined is political discourse 
analysis and all its definitions of political discourse set up by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), 
such as policy, argumentation, and deliberation. Their theory sought to diverge PDA from CDA 
using a more action-oriented approach, and also to highlight how this is achieved through 
argumentation and careful consideration of the facts present, and the value of the considered 
sides. The presented ideology is also structured around the reasonableness of an action, weighing 
the worth and effort, as well as approach, of the issue in deliberation, which gives it a more 
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fundamentally present and personal view of the politician behind the issue. This is the reason it is 
pertinent that Washington’s history as both a soldier and politician is well conceived before 
moving onto analysis. It is to give insight into his reasoning, and the lengths which he would be 
willing to go in certain issues, an insight which is required for the analysis of the potentiality 
within Washington’s warnings, which is presented through Manheim and Rich’s (1986) 
framework for interpretation of political substances. It allows me to further distance myself from 
the description of legitimacy of Washington’s power and in exchange discuss further about the 




5. Farewell Address 
Washington in his 1796 Farewell Address speaks at length of the issues and subjects that most 
troubled the First President while in office. Structured as an official letter to the people of the 
United States similar to an inaugural address, he spoke in a very formal and explanatory manner 
in this document, recorded by the Library of Congress for future generations. The subjects 
themselves are rather modern, and still present in political situations around the globe today.  
This section will begin the analysis of the Farewell Address, starting with an analysis of the 
Address’ construction and structure. It will discuss in more depth the creation of the Address, 
and to whom credit should be placed for its gradually evolving, somewhat meandering delivery 
that was so unlike Washington’s. It is notably uncommon language for Washington, whose 
speeches were recalled by a fellow politician, member of the Virginia Burgesses and Continental 
Congress, Thomas Jefferson as brief and unceremonious (Ferling 1988: 88). 
Following subsections discuss the main points of the Address. These are divided into the three 
categories mentioned before: domestic, foreign and commercial, which mean to introduce each 
subject to the reader with some contentious issues that highlight their existence. These issues will 
also provide parallels, which are useful for linking the past with the present. 
5.1. Construction of the Farewell Address 
The Farewell Address was an unusual piece in its time. Rather than addressing the Congress and 
the state leaders, Washington chose to speak to the people of the United States directly. It was an 
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idea suggested to him by James Madison during a private conversation in May, 17924. In the 
end, Washington heeded his suggestion in 1796 as he chose to release the Address in writing, 
where his words could be heard by a larger audience with preference shown to no one (Malanson 
2010: 13). More than that, it allowed his words to be said uninterrupted, or his vocals 
misinterpreted by only the few journalists that would be present at a public event. Such 
precautions could be expected from a man as shrewd as Washington, who had struggled to unite 
the nation and its new peoples while seeking to disparage none.  
It would come as a surprise to many that Washington was not the actual author of the Farewell 
Address, and that only his thoughts and philosophies that were penned onto paper. Binney (1859) 
examined the Address and other notable texts from the era and concluded that its compilation 
was not done by Washington himself. The 1796 address was, in fact, compiled by Hamilton; it 
was based upon drafts produced by Washington and an earlier draft (James Madison to George 
Washington, June 21 17925) constructed by Madison after Washington’s Conversation with the 
man in 1792 (Madison, May 1792; Binney 1859). To what extent did the Address change its 
form from the first draft proposed to Washington in 1792 and is publication in 1796? This 
section is to provide some insight into the substantial changes to the Address during its 
preparation, as well as to discuss in more depth the history behind the famous Address.  
The original draft of the Farewell Address was more akin to a declaration of retirement than a 
warning to the people of the United States about the dangers lurking in administration and 
politics. It can be seen from the draft produced by Madison in 1792 that there were few 
                                                 
4 See Madison, J. (May 25, 1792). Substance of a conversation with Pres. George Washington, May 5, 1792. Library 
of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/resource/mjm.05_0078_0081/?sp=1. 
5 Transcription of the first draft can be found from Horace Binney’s (1859) An Inquiry into the Formation of 
Washington’s Farewell Address, Appendix A.  
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functional warnings present, while the core subjects of party disputes, foul language spoken by 
parties and their degradation of government, and the necessity of Union and its wealth as one, are 
mentioned. Foreign politics, however, is not among them; while so profoundly integral to the 
published Address, it is non-existent in this early document. The propositions which caused 
tensions between United States and France at the time, and which made the Farewell Address 
one of the foremost documents of its time, and an example for foreign politics (by some 
considerations) for century and a half, were not there. 
This reveals the main focus and greatest challenge of Washington’s second term as president, as 
well as hints at his fall into partisanship itself. It also shows the influence that the Federalists had 
on Washington, especially through the trust shown to Hamilton. Not only was Washington’s 
second tenure teeming with diplomatic turmoil and the balancing of neutrality and independence 
(Bemis 1934; DeConde 1957), it was troubled by the maintenance of the Union to prevent it 
from fracturing into civil war due to Anglo-French disputes that tugged the two majority parties 
further apart (Binkley 1968: 67): pro-French Republicans led by Jefferson (p. 72) and the 
Federalists led by Hamilton (p. 29; Malanson 2020: 23).  
To highlight this change, consider the following. While Spalding (2001: 22) identified six issues 
from the final version of the Address, Binney (1859: 20—21) recognized four core statements 
from a letter to Madison that preceded the preparation of the first draft (Washington to Madison, 
May 20, 1792): a) Americans are one great people with a rich nation, b) the diversity of the 
Union is its strength, c) the leader of the nation should remain open to all sides, and not sow 
discord of the Union, and d) speculation and accusation sow discord. When comparing these two 
contents, one can detect that there was a definitive shift away from internal politics and toward 
foreign policy that took place during Washington’s second term that influenced the final draft. 
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First, Washington made no apparent discussion about alliances, as can be seen from the first 
draft produced by Madison, and from the communiques between Washington and Madison in the 
spring of 1792. There is little in the way of even consideration of matters outside of the Union. 
Washington was sincerely interested in maintaining the Union’s integrity at this tumultuous time, 
highlighting the instability that the Republic faced its early days. These same worries propose a 
reason why Jefferson was adamant that Washington should serve another term in office in 1792 
(Jefferson to Washington, May 23, 1792), and why Washington was willing to accept another 
term in office, as it showed the fears present in the draft of the Address to be a potential the 
threat to the continuance of the Union (Ferling 1988: 422—3).  
Second, there was no discussion present in the first draft about potential benefit from expanding 
beyond the United States current territory. While Washington did speak of the potential of the 
United States, and how its diversity in peoples and environment would be beneficial for the 
Union, he did not go as far as to speak of the potential found from trade. This was certainly an 
issue that was raised to Washington’s agenda by the French and British privateering fleets on the 
Atlantic after the British involvement in the French Revolution (Bemis 1934: 252), especially 
after the US had been effectively cut off from major ports due to the on-going differences 
between their old parent state and the fledgling nation (Binkley 1968: 8—12). The complexities 
of this trade will be discussed in more depth later on, but it is important to note how imperative 
this was for the overall meaning of the final draft to not be present in the original. It set the 
United States on a more neutral, but offensive mercantile path that sought to protect its interests 
over that of inclusion in world affairs. In one way, it was Washington’s Farewell Address that 
plays the first notes of what we would become to understand as capitalism: a philosophy of 
governance that is more focused on the functionalities of trade, than global dominance through 
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the force of arms (though that is conjecture due to the lack of direct input by the Address). It 
does show the durability of Hamilton’s ideology behind the Address’ statements, as it was to his 
interests and aligned with his ideologies to promote a commercially wealthy nation that would 
give rise to a “propertied elite” that would create a lynchpin in the national unity which would 
keep its people under control (Ferling 1988: 386—7). 
The four years that transpired between the conception and publishing of the Address, then, shows 
significant growth in the ideas present in the Address, but also a change in the worldly situation. 
The construction of the Address, from its draft to its published form, of which there were many 
as is found from Binney’s (1859) inquiry and its Appendixes which contain the pertinent notes 
about the subject, gives some insight into the explosive nature of the Address. It was drafted by 
Washington at a time when he was willing to step down as an example for the people and 
because of his personal health, but transformed at the hands of Hamilton and Washington, and 
the poignancy of foreign politics between 1792 and 1796 into a piece more openly abrasive 
against the vices of government and partisanship that Washington had originally perceived as 
mere “spirit of party.” Many of these changes were evident in a draft created by Washington in 
1796 (Binney 1859: Appendix No. I), in which he expresses more or less the same issues that are 
present in the final draft. This draft does not differ too greatly from the final draft in terms of 
concepts, rather in the style in which they were delivered. Washington’s writing style was 
analysed by Binney (1859: 41—42) to be more independent by structure, each paragraph a 
concept of its own, while the final draft of the Farewell Address was more a flowing 
argumentation over its whole length. However, as Pessen (1987: 6—7) notes, Washington made 
some changes to the final draft by Hamilton to solidify his position on the issues and to remove 
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vagueness from the overall text, proving that Washington was the final voice within the Address 
as he made precise changes that were founded on his ideals. 
In conclusion, while it is unquestionable that Madison, then Hamilton helped Washington 
construct the Address, there are some questions about its contents. While Madison was given 
rather free reign to develop the first draft, shown in his “substance of a conversation with Pres. 
George Washington” (May 25, 1792), the draft sent to Hamilton was far more refined. While it 
contained many of the arguments that would end up in the final draft, it was also changed 
significantly from the original in style. It defined the Address as a personal farewell, less than a 
point to point system of warnings and ideas that Washington’s writings were in general, and 
contained less compromising materials that would open Washington’s character for debate (see 
Binney 1859: 60). Therefore, Hamilton’s modifications were chosen to be published due to their 
realization of Washington’s ideals, and by being less provocative in nature. Though the contents 
of the Address transformed through experience, they remained those of Washington’s as he at all 
points in time chose what to say and what to leave out from the published version. 
5.2. Domestic issues raised in the Farewell Address 
As was concluded earlier, Spalding (2001) and Binney (1859) extrapolated multiple different 
ideas from the Farewell Address. However, due to their interconnected nature I have chosen to 
condense them into three major categories: domestic, commercial and foreign. The first one to be 
examined are those of domestic nature: these include the spirit of party and the spirit of revenge. 
Overall, these issues aggravate a nation’s existing internal divisions, causing animosity amongst 
parties and were well known ideas before Washington published his Farewell Address. 
Furthermore, they function as an underlying principle behind some modern policies which are 
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used to diminish the opposing party’s base and to strengthen one’s own. While on the surface 
this appears like mild competition, it is a known symptom before drastic action, like that which 
occurred prior to the United States’ Civil War.  
5.2.1. Party spirit 
“There cannot a greater Judgment befal a Country than such a dreadful Spirit of 
Division as rends a Government into two distinct People, and makes them greater 
Strangers and more averse to one another, than if they were actually two different 
Nations.”(Addison, July 24, 1711, The Spectator, No. 125). 
These are the words of Joseph Addison (1672—1719) who wrote for The Spectator between 
1711—1712, alongside its founding partner Richard Steele. It highlights fantastically the ideas 
present in Washington’s Farewell Address many decades later, and proves that the concepts he 
discussed of volatile behaviour and conflict within a nation were present in the minds of people 
prior to the founding of the United States of America, as were many of the ideas present in the 
Address (Pessen 1987: 6). It was indeed a fear of Addison that violent discord may have serious 
consequences, as is shown in the following paragraph: “A furious Party Spirit, when it rages in 
its full Violence, exerts it self in Civil War and Bloodshed” (Addison & Steele July 24, 1711, 
The Spectator, No. 125). 
Taking his warning into consideration, it cannot be dismissed how dangerous the idea of party 
spirit can be to a nation, and how its dangers have been identified throughout history. However, 
not always is party spirit negative in form, as will be discussed later on in section 6.1. There are 
many ways in which it can manifest itself, of which some arguments lead to a compromise or the 
continuation of the status quo (Gutmann & Thompson 2010) in a system (system in this case is a 
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reference to the whole nation, including its form of government and administration). Very often 
the polarization of parties is seen as foulmouthed exclamations and accusations that undermine 
the system and one another, and turn opinion of one side against another for justification or gain 
(Pessen 1987: 18; 21). This can be seen in modern day politics, especially in the advent of 
multimedia and social media, which gives opponents the opportunity to lash out against one 
another in very public form without the ability by the other to intervene or defend one’s self. 
Party spirit, as Addison already stated by their fear of war, can exhibit physical qualities as well. 
These are not always violent or vocal, and some can be rather stealthy in the way in which they 
influence the system, manipulate party and people’s opinion. While less openly aggressive, they 
do not diminish their degradation of the system, especially a democratic one. One such method is 
that of gerrymandering, as it is known in the vernacular, or redistricting; it is the act of dividing 
an elective area into districts by those currently in power (Engstrom 2013). This combined with 
the assigned number of votes per district, based on the majority instead of an individual vote, 
gives room for manipulation of districts into more efficient form that might swing the district one 
way or another. A modern example of this is the red-blue state moniker that is used to describe to 
whom the popular vote in a state, or a district, fell to, used most controversially during 
Presidential elections (Shin & Webber 2014). Until the 20th century there were no rules against 
it, and has been used to great political effect by all ruling parties (Engstrom 2013). Even in the 
21st century it is not heavily monitored, though some oversight has been introduced by the 
judiciary after the civil rights movement of the 1960s seeking to prevent minority district 
discrimination (Engstrom 2013).  
Racial discrimination in gerrymandering became more common after the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, when minority right to vote was reinforced by legislation and successive Supreme Court 
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decisions that both limited gerrymandering based on racial bias, as well as declaring zoning 
based solely on racial bias unlawful. This in practice was the drawing of districts that diminished 
the effect of coloured votes, or even ensuring that they would have minimal effect on the state 
level. While these have been limited by court decisions, the Supreme Court avoided intervening 
in a political question, and has therefore left the matter to be solved by the legislature. (Engstrom 
2013).  
Meanwhile, in Washington’s time the concept of gerrymandering and redistricting was not yet an 
apparent tool, especially in regards to voting as the contemporary interpretation of the 
Constitution limited the voting to a portion of the population; it excluded wholly all women and 
coloured people from voting. However, he was aware of its slow emergence in the country, as he 
called it out through the term “geographical discrimination” (Washington 1796). This form of 
discrimination lacks the same racial quality that we ascribe to it now, and means physically 
identifying between sides, and characterizing them accordingly. This is common in United States 
culture even today, as one can recognize from the still persisting terms northern and southern, 
and identifying them through these monikers alone. Worry is that these division would grow 
over time, and become more integral to the identity of the party and their state. An example of 
this form of division would be the earlier mentioned red-blue state monikers, as well as the 
recognition between free and slave-states (see Grant 2012: 145, fig. 5.3.). 
One way in which geographical discrimination occurred during Washington’s time as President 
was, when Alexander Hamilton as Treasury Secretary began efforts to increase northern 
industry, while seemingly dismissing the agricultural south (Grant 2012: 150). This would 
eventually have significant ramifications in United States history in the following century, but 
also acts now as proof to one of Washington’s warnings; it is one that was in fact recognized by 
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Hamilton himself as it was written in his version of the Farewell Address (Binney 1859: 199). 
The warning was of an individual, a “chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more 
fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation on the 
ruins of public liberty” (Washington 1796). As Grant (2012: 150) notes, the financial structure of 
the United States was at the time under Congressional control since the Constitution’s 
ratification. An interpretation can be made that Hamilton, controlling Congress6 and national 
finances through his position as secretary of the treasury, was utilizing this autocratic authority to 
elevate his personal agenda and to propose a national dimorphism based on geographic 
discrimination between the north and the south. 
The Farewell Address echoes Hamilton’s defence of this policy, as well as Washington’s 
conciliatory tone to the new ideas his secretary of the treasury presented. It seeks to plead unity, 
and speaks of the benefits that co-operation has over disharmony and conflict:  
“The North, in an unrestrained intercourse with the South […] finds in the 
productions of the latter great additional resources […] The south in the same 
intercourse, benefitting by the agency of the North, sees its agriculture grow and 
its commerce expand.” (Washington 1796). 
Furthermore, it shows an understanding of the underlying division that existed within the United 
States, and of the imbalance that would continue to exhibit itself throughout western expansion. 
The geographic discrimination that Washington was already worried about in his Address would 
be exasperated as new territories were added to the country, and the two sides became more 
                                                 
6 Hamilton’s power over Congress is shown by the multiple bills that were passed during Washington’s Presidency 
that failed to be reconstituted under non-Federalist administrations, such as the Bank Bill of 1791, but also 
willingness of the Congress to rely solely on his advice (Wood 2009: 92). 
45 
 
distinct from one another. However, instead of a question of agriculture and industry, the 
prevalent source of competition and division between the North and the South throughout the 
19th century revolved around the question of slavery. 
As the United States grew larger, more states were added to it7. This continuous growth meant a 
more varied Congress, but one that threatened the balance in Congress and the Senate (Grant 
2012: 166). This in turn bound the political ideology of slavery to the well-being of the party, 
giving rise to the spirit of party to defend their ideology. It separated everyone into their partisan 
corners: to those that supported the institution of slavery, and to those that opposed it as an 
affront to the liberties present in the Constitution. An idealistic divide within, which Addison 
saw as the greatest threat to harmony. 
As such, the Civil War was a product of party spirit; or more accurately the defence a political 
ideas, and the geographical discrimination created by attempts to resist political fracturing, such 
as the Missouri Compromise, which created an arbitrary line below which slavery was allowed 
and above which it was banned (Grant 2012: 158). It was a question of votes: a matter who 
controlled the Congress and the Senate, as the Constitution allows for amendments to be 
suggested “whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary … or, on the Application 
of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,” and be valid “when ratified by the 
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof” 
(U.S. Const., art. V). Therefore both parties struggled to maintain a steadfast balance as to not 
give the other sufficient votes to pass legislation that would threaten their perspective. It was 
                                                 
7 See Grant (2012: 145) figure 5.3., which shows the division between free and slave states, as well as the year they 
ratified the Constitution and officially joined the United States. 
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redistricting that can be seen as a tool that balanced this strife for a while, as Southern states 
could prevent the ascension of opposing parties in their states and vice versa. 
In the end, the western expansion that Washington had seen as an opportunity for the nation 
would turn against it (as the race to designate states was limited by the Pacific) and the territories 
in-between were quickly divided into the two factions. Some of these states chose to oppose the 
Missouri Compromise in the 1820s (Grant 2012: 166), giving the choice of slavery to the 
electors (p. 168). This was on par with Washington’s ideology: 
“If in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the 
constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an 
amendment in the way which the Constitution designated. But let there be no 
change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of 
good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed.” 
(Washington 1796).  
History, however, tells us that the decision to allow people to choose only vocalized the issue of 
slavery in the United States and destroyed the carefully maintained balance between the North 
and the South (Grant 2012: 168). It shows a miscalculation by Washington’s about the united 
spirit that all Americans shared, demolished by party spirit. Of course, it is important to highlight 
that the decision of slavery was made at a state-level, not on the Constitutional-level, as 
Washington’s Farewell Address clearly states. This harkens back to Washington’s opinions 
about a strong Federal government (Ferling 1988: 351—2; 358—9), but also shows that he did 
not trust the people to make a valid decision without there being an element of oversight like that 
of the Congress, Senate and the President. 
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Moreover, he foresaw the dangers of the people deciding for themselves. He had lived through a 
momentous occasion such as that himself: the Revolution itself was a means by which the people 
decided against the government through usurpation. While in this “one instance” (referring to the 
Revolution) it was “the instrument of good,” it was not one that had a good reputation (take into 
consideration the Reign of Terror in the aftermath of the French Revolution). There was always a 
possibility that the people would choose to express themselves through the party spirit, which 
could dissolve national unity. 
Overall, we can detect some parallels with the events leading to the Civil War and the 
Revolution. First a legislative opinion was created in the form of the Missouri compromise, 
much like the taxation laws of Britain prior to the Revolution. Second there was a public outcry 
against the measure which divided the population; during the Revolution it was between those 
that supported the British Crown, and in Civil War those that supported slave-ownership. Third 
there was an issue of representation, which in the case of the Civil War was a partisan issue and a 
carefully maintained balance in the legislature, while prior to the Revolution it was about the 
lack of colonial self-governance, and equal representation of their ideas in the British Parliament. 
And fourth an opposing faction constructed its own legislative body through a partisan opinion, 
which during the Revolution was known as the Continental Congress and during the Civil War 
known as the Confederate States of America. 
These four parallels seemingly connect the two separate events, and reveal an underlying 
framework through which Washington’s warnings seek to disrupt the generation of party spirit. 
An emergence of a scheme that is proposed by a dominative government, proceeds to divide 
opinion and creates a barrier within the nation between two physically identifiable sides. This is 
then exasperated by a competition over their own opinion during which both sides strengthen 
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their support within their individual area, and which if not addressed through amendments leads 
to violent confrontation against the dominant government.  
5.2.2. Spirit of Revenge 
While the earlier examination focused on the spirit of the party and the factions within a society, 
this subsection will focus on the “spirit of revenge,” as was mentioned by Washington as 
“natural to party dissension.” It is a separate idea due to its fundamentally wanton need to do 
harm to the other without regards to order and consequence. As a subsection of party spirit, 
however, it is never too far from the behaviour of an individual and a group of people.  
Revenge as a concept is an act, or a response against a person who committed wrong in a prior 
event to the instigator of revenge. Modern culture acknowledges many different forms of 
revenge. It can be a quick, physical action which can, for instance in keeping with the 
presidential atmosphere, be the assassination of Abraham Lincoln by John Wilkes Booth, to 
whom Kauffman (2004) presents a motive of vengeance for the fall of the Confederacy. Revenge 
can also be slow and methodological, often times nonsensical by the observer, as is the case of 
Miss Havisham’s revenge on all men in the “Great Expectations” by Charles Dickens (2002) by 
teaching her adopted child Estella to scorn all men with her behaviour. Similarly, in an act of 
revenge Estella marries a gold digger to attack her mother’s earlier behaviour, an act that only 
leads to misfortune, as it did with Miss Havisham.  
“Great Expectations” is an accurate depiction, then, of the wanton nature of revenge. The way in 
which it leads to ruin and misfortune. While in Dickens’ story it is a personal ruin, to 
Washington it meant internal strife within the nation and the destruction of liberty and 
democracy. In United States history acts of revenge are unfortunately common. As will be 
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discussed in section 8.1, revenge can be found from the Sedition Act of 1798. It can also be seen 
in the manner by which the Confederacy withdrew from the Union, as a reaction to their loss in 
the presidential election to Abraham Lincoln and the imbalance of the Missouri Compromise. In 
the modern day, it is most notably present in voter discrimination, especially of those 
incarcerated. To this day, around a quarter of the states remove a felony offender’s right to vote 
(NCSL 2021), itself a means of revenge against those that have worked against the law. Yet in 
another, it is a means by which parties of a given state manipulate the voting system to draw 
themselves above their opponent (Engstrom 2013). 
More bombastically, the spirit of revenge can be discerned from the actions of the 45th President 
of the United States, Donald Trump’s, behaviour toward Obama-era legislation. Primarily the 
social-welfare policies and legislation of the previous president from the opposing (Democratic) 
party. Trump has already taken actions to repeal the Affordable Care Act, known colloquially as 
Obamacare, in 2017 (Glenza 2017), though those efforts failed to collapse the act. They did, 
however, reveal the bipartisan polarization on the issue (Thompson, Gusmano & Shinohara 
2018) and the wish to cause harm to the opposing party by striking against a signature legislation 
of the party opponent. 
Similarly into the spirit of revenge can be counted the 2019–2020 efforts to impeach Trump, and 
any and all retributions taken by Trump in the aftermath of his acquittal in February 2020. As 
well as Trump’s actions at the start of 2021 following his election defeat, and the voting 
regulations filed in many Republican states to combat voter activity. They are prime examples of 
the spirit of revenge in action within recent memory, and historically significant enough to be 
remembered. The effects of January 2021 even thread close to Washington’s warnings of a 
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dominant party and how its “chief … turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation 
on the ruins of public liberty.” 
Lastly, spirit of revenge is a form of offence that is used to supress any form of media that 
offends the leading party. In United States, the Sedition Act of 1798 (History, Art & Archives) 
was a controversial piece, which was seen as a threat to first amendment rights to criticize the 
government. An examination of the case of James Callender (Smith 1954) in section 8.1 is in 
many ways an example of the spirit of revenge in action, as the piece itself is an attack against 
government action, which is then reciprocated as the administration turns against the published 
criticism. 
Overall, then, party spirit and the spirit of revenge are most highlighted by the uses of political 
discourse and the interplay between rival parties. It can be an act of libel, mockery or actual 
disenfranchisement of millions (Rosenberg 1984; Engstrom 2013). Party spirit can fracture a 
nation, as it did during the Civil War and during the civil rights movement (Grant 2012: 168—9; 
375), and tends to intensify during elections, as in 1796 when Washington witnessed (reciprocal) 
attacks against fellow politicians and himself (DeConde 1957: 654). It can also present itself in 
attacks against legislation and works that are significant to the opposition, as was the case with 
Obamacare (Thompson, Gusmano & Shinohara 2018). 
5.3. American policy of commercial neutrality 
“The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our 
commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. 
So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect 
good faith. Here let us stop.” (Washington 1796). 
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George Washington can be considered to be the founder of the United States foreign policy for 
almost a century and a half following his death. His ideas, recorded in the Farewell Address, 
entrenched the idea of isolationism into a national creed (Nordlinger 2001: 50—2; Wright 1943). 
His words manifested a policy of independence from the squabbles of the European theatre and 
structured their relationship into one of economic in principle. Isolationism to Washington was 
just that, independence from foreign affairs. The excerpt above, taken from the Farewell 
Address, highlights Washington’s noncommittal approach to foreign politics, and how his wish 
was to maintain neutral relations to the outside world. It shows his wish to maintain the integrity 
and trust of the nation state by fulfilling obligations they had assumed earlier, such as the Treaty 
of amity and commerce with the French, signed in 1778 when the country was fighting for its 
freedom.   
This did not mean that the United States would be a stagnant nation for the larger world. As 
Nordlinger (2001) discusses, the United States in its state of isolation focused on internal 
matters, choosing to focus on expansion through the North American continent and 
strengthening national security and sphere of influence8. The engagements mentioned by 
Washington were also part of these internal matters as they solidified their independence from 
the continental powers of Europe, allowing the United States to grow to become the powerhouse 
of economy and manufacturing in the 19th and 20th century (Grant 2012).  
Furthermore, Washington nor any of his successors had reason to diverge from this path of 
isolation. Because the United States was a fledgling country for the early part of the 19th 
                                                 
8 While many can hold this against the belief that United States was an isolationist power, I would see it as an 
extension of their wish to remain separate from the world at large, choosing to move at their own pace rather than 
with anyone else. 
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century, and focused on internal matters, Washington’s words, as well as those of Alexander 
Hamilton and James Madison (Nordlinger 2001: 50), led them to internal expansion due to the 
lack of interests abroad. What use would the United States have with Cuba while their own 
internal politics were threatening to tear the nation apart? (DeConde 1957). Indeed, only a policy 
decision to prevent a European expansion into the United States’ territorial waters of the Atlantic 
and the Pacific managed to wrangle the nation out of its shell in the late 19th century; an 
ideology that gained support after the destruction of the Maine, a United States warship docked 
at Havana (Grant 2012: 251—3). Similar parallels can be drawn with the sinking of the RMS 
Lusitania in 1915, where over a hundred American civilians died (among many others during the 
submarine war), which acted one of the many causes for the United States to join World War I 
(Grant 2012: 269; Startt 2017: 45; 114).  
 The United States, then, would not attack without just cause. Similarly to the war of 1812 
(which will be discussed in more depth in section 8.2), they acted more in self-defence. It was in 
accordance with Washington’s mantra, in which through a “respectably defensive posture, we 
may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.” Whether the sinking of 
the Lusitania can be considered an emergency is debatable. It presented one at home, where 
protests erupted over the action, decrying the German excuse and repeated violation of the 
United States’ neutrality. 
Neutrality to Washington was of national interest alone. In the Farewell Address he does not 
suggest that the United States should push to the territories of other nations, instead, he suggests 
that the nation focuses on the internal matters so that they might strengthen their position on the 
global stage through credibility. To him, this could be achieved through commerce, as a wealthy 
nation able to sustain itself was also able to dictate its own rules. As a businessman (Ferling 
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1988: 69—71), Washington knew the benefit of access to markets, and how good connections 
could provide that access. Through his experience in war, he knew how much war cost to a 
nation; he had seen first hand the actions of the British Empire as they struggled to pay the debts 
accumulated in wars with France. 
Moreover, he also had experienced the headache that entanglements with foreign nations could 
cause, as was the case with France (Bemis 1934; Binkley 1968: 51; DeConde 1957). While the 
United States had formed an alliance with France in 1778 to bolster the war for independence, in 
1796 Washington was in a place where he had to choose between war and peace. To abide by the 
treaty was to go to war with the British, which would inevitably draw the United States into a 
conflict on its own borders due to the prevalence of British troops in Canada. It would also 
threaten shipping across the Atlantic, whose neutrality was already under attack by both navies 
(Bemis 1934; Ferling 1988: 465). Therefore, Washington’s calls for neutrality in the Address 
were based on, in addition to a wish for the United States to remain focused on the internal 
matters, a hope to remain free of the troubles in Europe, and to protect the country from foreign 
threats. 
In practice, Washington’s ideology configured into the Jay Treaty, which sought a commercial 
compromise to the issues present. This was a means by which the United States could remain at 
peace with Britain and increase national benefit through trade, but with which they worsened 
their relations with France (Wood 2009: 239—75). Similarly, as will be discussed later on in 
sections 6.3 and 8.3., commerce would not remain a method to maintain neutrality in furthering 
tensions between two nations. In fact, unlike Washington’s Address desired, it would become a 




“It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated 
access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the 
policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.” 
(Washington 1796).  
Washington was adamant in his Address about warnings against foreign influences within the 
United States (DeConde 1957). He warned against foreign agents tampering with “domestic 
factions,” and “mislead[ing] public opinion, to influence or awe the public councils!” This was 
best highlighted by the actions of the French minister Edmond Gênet, who raised a privateer fleet 
to raid British shipping along the United States’ coastline (Ferling 1988: 432—3); and French 
Ambassador Pierre Adet, who took it upon himself to turn the people of the United States against 
the British, and whose actions led to significant turmoil within the United States (DeConde 
1957). These actions took place before and around the time that the Address was being compiled 
by Washington and Hamilton, and within the overall complex political situation of the 1790s. It 
culminated in the Jay Treaty, which allowed the British to confiscate French goods aboard 
American shipping, something the French were not allowed to do due to earlier attachments, and 
placed many American exports under a contraband list to protect British interests (Ferling 1988: 
457). This enflamed the situation, highlighting the fortified anti-British sentiment throughout the 
old colonies. The French naturally took advantage of the moment to create political pressure and 
attacks against pro-treaty politicians, and thus against the Federalists and Washington, to secure 
their own personal interests (Bemis 1934: 252, 252n3; Ferling 1988: 456). 
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Washington’s Address was a powerful tool to the Federalists: it openly presented the subject of 
foreign influencing and its detrimental effects to society. The Address could even be interpreted 
as an attack against Jefferson’s Republicans and their willingness to subjugate themselves to the 
will of the French government through their compliance with the French provocations across the 
country. It put under question the Republican integrity and loyalty to the United States, and made 
them appear subservient to the will of the French. Counterintuitively, after the Farewell Address’ 
release, the French intensified their attacks against Washington and the Federalists, affirming 
Washington’s statements and allowing the Federalists to combat the French ideals and their 
beneficiary, Jefferson’s candidacy in the upcoming elections. The Federalists called out the 
irrelevancy and dangers of diplomatic associations in politics, and highlighted the Jay Treaty as 
positive outcome as an extension to the 1783 treaty of Paris, and sought to clarify issues that had 
been present in the original peace deal. By attacking the Farewell Address (and thus 
Washington) directly, the French caused an upsurge in anti-French sentiment among people that 
saw them as a threat to American liberty; a new host that sought to rule over the United States. 
This matter was criticized in the Federalist papers throughout the country, and the purpose of the 
alliance with the French questioned. (Bemis 1934: 252; DeConde 1957). 
In a way, the Federalists broke Washington’s ideas of party spirit and the spirit of revenge by 
allowing themselves to be drawn into a verbal conflict with their opponent, which distanced the 
two sides at a crucial time when a popular president was stepping down from office. In the 
Address, foreign influencing was correlated with the party spirit and domestic infighting. With 
conflict between two parties or more, each attempting to disseminate false information about the 
other, Washington warned of foreign influencers seeking to drive a wedge between the two sides 
by creating an artificial fracture within the Union. Through the vision of a party and their fervent 
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beliefs, the foreign influencers could create discord between the two sides and thus incite “riot 
and insurrection”, while subjugating the infighting nations to the “policy and will of another.” 
Perhaps the best example of this comes from more recent times, and from the era of the internet. 
Due to wide conversational networks and anonymity online, people and characters can be used to 
great extent by nations to influence the perception of facts and information. Levush (2019) 
discusses this subject in her report about the uses and defences against disinformation and the 
systems that are used to spread and combat them. It proves that disinformation has played a role 
in modern elections and establishes why online activity will continue to be utilized as a means of 
influencing an election. In United States, one of the largest and most notable occasions of this 
style of influencing comes from the 2016 presidential elections, when foreign agents attacked the 
election infrastructure and spread disinformation, which was used extensively to discourage 
voters and discredit selected officials (U.S. Senate Intelligence).9 
In the aftermath of Donald Trump’s election to office, one can identify signs of heightened 
tensions between the two parties, as well as among the populace. It led to multiple protests 
between the two sides immediately after the 45th president’s inauguration, more vocal than in 
earlier transitions. These culminated in the January 6, 2021 attack against the US Capitol 
building, in what contemporary news referred to as a siege or a breach, and a riot.10 A huge part 
in the controversy that led to the attack against the Capitol building was the question of election 
results. It is speculated in Volume 1 of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee Report that such 
mistrust could have been the intention of the foreign agents in the 2016 elections, and thus it 
                                                 
9 Volume 1 focuses on the attacks against the voting systems, while Volume 2 assess Russian activity through social 
media, and the succeeding volumes focus on threat assessment and counter-intelligence. 
10 For collection of news articles about the January 6 Capitol attack, see: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/us-
capitol-breach; https://apnews.com/hub/capitol-siege. [Retrieved April 1, 2021]. 
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could have played a role in the 2020 elections, in which the then sitting President Trump 
attacked the integrity of election results, though it should be noted that he never placed the blame 
on foreign agents but on the opposing party, highlighting the effects of party spirit once more. 
While the warnings against foreign influences in the Farewell Address point more toward 
political conversation, it can also be used to question commerce. During the 1790s, the French 
and the British were attacking neutral ships to bolster their own war efforts (Bemis 1934, Ferling 
1988: 465). The French were especially keen on preventing supplies from reaching Britain on 
American ships after the Jay Treaty came into full effect (Wood 2009: 239). This can be seen 
either as an act of revenge for the decisions made by the Washington administration, or as a 
means by which the French sought to pressure Americans back into line with their opinion (the 
aspect of foreign influencing in regards to commerce will be discussed in sections 6.3 and 8.3).   
In conclusion, there are many forms of foreign influencing, from trade to politics, and even to 
Washington it was a balancing act between usefulness and threat. It can give rise to domestic 
issues that are instigated by foreign agents through support given to a party or their opinion. It is 
also a matter of disinformation and utilization of core issues to divide public opinion, raise 
political maliciousness and arouse the spirit of revenge, and to discredit leadership and 
opponents (DeConde 1957). In more modern times, the threat comes through the internet, where 
disinformation is spread through social media and other actors (Levush 2019). While these 
actions are prevalent in society, only in worse case scenarios will they have the potential to 
instigate violence, which was shown by recent events to be possible through the collision of 




6. Farewell Address in contrast 
This section is to balance the content already discussed. In it, I will discuss some aspects of 
Washington’s Farewell Address from a separate point of view, starting from the intra-party 
politics that have often been turbulent in the United States. I will continue on to a discussion 
about the Grand Alliance of World War II and NATO, as well as the current status of world trade 
and global organizations. The purpose of this section is not to dispute Washington’s warnings 
nor to accredit them, merely to explore the potential opposite which they represent, and which in 
some cases may attribute a defence for his ideals.  
6.1. Intra-party politics 
“Left unchallenged masters of the political field after 1816, the Republicans were 
to discover presently the disintegrating effect of a multi-group party of the 
disappearance of a common enemy, a vigorous political opposition.” (Binkley 
1968: 94).  
This quote highlights a reaction to an event, where a singular party gains absolute power over the 
other. In opposition to Washington’s claims that it would lead to “ruins of public liberty,” it 
instead hints that this power could redistribute itself as a reaction to the lack of opposition; that a 
party, left unchallenged in the political field and without competition, finds itself in a position of 
infighting. Once there are no more issues in the wider scale to unify them, they shatter into 
smaller groups, which then prevents the function of the party as a whole in practice. A historical 
example exists of this happening in the United States, in which a singular ruling party splintered 
to form the two major parties present today: Democrats and the Republicans (Binkley 1968).  
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After the War of 1812, the Federalist Party, which heavily resisted the war, voting against it 
along party lines, practically disintegrated. They nominated no-one to the presidential and vice-
presidential races in 1816 and 1820, giving all-choice to the Democratic-Republican Party 
(formerly Jefferson’s Republican Party) who re-elected James Monroe without opposition. This 
era, known colloquially as the Era of Good Feelings, lasted through his two terms as president 
from 1817—1825, after which the Democratic-Republican Party split into four parties during the 
election of 1824. These then coalesced into two noticeably separate parties: Democrat and 
National Republican parties, which more or less maintained their structures up to the Civil War. 
(Binkley 1968; Wood 2009).  
As such, it is not definitive that a singular party, if elected over another en masse, would 
constitute the end of liberty as Washington claimed. Neither is his stance that party spirit is 
wholly negative in form. Muirhead (2006: 718) argues that party spirit is not only an expression 
of “a particular and essential kind of democratic virtue,” but “an essential element in the quest 
for justice.” Muirhead (2006: 715; 719) highlights the functions of a party as a means of 
connecting people and their many views into a cohesive unit that is easier to understand, and 
allows for power to be consolidated under a majority, should the party opinion gain enough 
support from a wide range of people. A party’s purpose, then, is to lead these people and find a 
balance within their internal views: a compromise, of sorts, from this range of different views 
and approaches that benefits them the best. 
Beyond this form of partisanship, Muirhead (2006: 722) highlights that of ethical partisanship, 
where those that have no attachments to any party have a better capacity to view objectively at 
the parties and their positions on certain issues. These people also recognize that a “victory 
should never be total” (p. 722), but instead act as a voice of opposition to prod the quality of that 
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which is presented, whether this be an election or legislation. Those engaged in ethical 
partisanship participate in political argumentation with certain limitations, and Muirhead (2006: 
722) argues that they do not support those that attempt to promote their own political superiority: 
these would essentially be bills that regulate voting, or seek to discriminate the electorate. Such 
occasions, where voting is restricted or somehow diminishes votership, will lead to a loss of 
ethical partisanship and thus promotes an uncontrolled party spirit that provokes conflict. Similar 
situations can occur naturally, as well: In the example given of the United States in the aftermath 
of the War of 1812, the country saw a loss in ethical partisanship as diminished votership 
without an opposition to vote for. This in turn lowered the amount of active voters, which only 
rose to former levels when the leading faction was faced by opposing faction with different 
ideals (Sydnor 1946). 
As such, it appears that partisanship is integral to democracy and the democratic process, and not 
necessarily the destructive force that Washington feared. If anything can learned from the Era of 
Good Feelings, is that partisanship can provide integrity to the system by promoting competition. 
Through ethical partisanship and appealing to a larger population, a party can further solidify its 
position by achieving a higher majority within the legislative body. However, actions that seek to 
restrict votership, or somehow diminish and attack the opposition, promote party spirit and 
damage national unity. One style of legislative reform that can be considered an attack against 
opposition, and was not discussed in this section, is a restriction on political speech: this form of 





6.2. United States: a global ally 
Washington’s ideals in the Farewell Address called for good relations and limited political 
contact with other nations; foreign relations was to be focused on commercial ties, and nothing 
more. United States has throughout its history neglected this advice by distrusting foreign 
nations, such as the Soviet Union (Pessen 1987: 12—13), and by allying itself either with a 
global partner, or a local ally to combat their opponent’s influence. During the Revolution, for 
instance, they joined forces with France through the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1778 to 
fight the British. Fighting in the frontier against native tribes also occurred often with a Native 
American ally (Wood 2009: 125). Similarly, almost no conflict today is fought by a singular 
belligerent, rather by two or more due to the defensive treaties that connect most of the world. 
Such an organization would today be the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Grant 
2012).  
Indeed, the United States today has a myriad of alliances and treaties in place which bind them to 
other countries (U.S. Department of State). Some of them have provided it with means to defend 
itself, as for instance the close relationship with Canada that allowed for an early warning system 
against bombers during the Cold War11. Others have proved less beneficial over the years, like 
the inclusion of Turkey in NATO, whose actions in recent years have put the organization into a 
difficult position. Its relations with its neighbouring Greece, another NATO member state, have 
deteriorated and weapons purchases from Russia have made United States sanction the nation 
(Pamuk & Gumrukcu 2020).  
                                                 
11 Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line was a radar defence line, which depended on Canada’s support for the 
operation to function and cover the Artic against the possible incursion of Soviet bombers and give an early warning 
for United States and Canada to launch fighters to intercept. 
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As such, one can see the difficulties of entanglements that Washington spoke of. To ally with a 
nation is to put the United States in a position where its credibility may be put to question. 
Where it may be drawn into: 
“[…] frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our 
concerns. […] Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, 
entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, 
interest, humor, or caprice?” (Washington 1796). 
Yet, as it was mentioned, United States has formulated many alliances with the European nations 
over the years and found itself embroiled in many of its wars, most notably the two world wars 
(Grant 2012). The Cold War especially was one to solidify United States and Europe as allies 
through the threat of the Soviet Union and Communism that the two presented, though the 
conflicts created by the hostility against Communist ideals expanded beyond its continental 
borders. Most of the defensive treaties originate from this era and seemingly play into 
Washington’s ideology that the nation could trust on “temporary alliances for extraordinary 
emergencies” (Washington 1796). Pessen (1987: 18—9) argues otherwise, attributing the 
justifications to amoral behaviour by the era’s leadership, uncouth for the principles set forth by 
Washington. Whether or not these decisions were able to counteract the behaviour and led to 
further peace, I will not argue in this thesis. It does raise a valid question: since the Soviet Union 
no longer exists and the discussion of Cold War has moved to the past, has this threat not 
disappeared and thus made the alliances obsolete? 
It is true that the Cold War ended, however, it does not mean that threats ceased to exist. For 
defensive purposes and as a matter of readiness, the United States operates multiple foreign 
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operations abroad, like that of Japan, who pays billions of dollars annually to host United States 
forces as a deterrent against military action in the region (Chanlett-Avery, Campbell & Williams 
2019). Tensions within the region, especially around the question of Taiwan, could also be 
paralleled to that of the Cold War. Therefore, it would appear that while the rivalry that once 
existed between the United States and the Soviet Union ended upon the latter’s collapse, the 
rivalry between the East and the West did not. Thus, this seemingly shows that the emergencies 
for which Washington approved alliances still persisted as a means to defend the states. 
However, it does so in disregard of his wishes to remain nonpartisan as “excessive partiality for 
one foreign nation and excessive dislike of another, cause those whom they actuate to see danger 
only on one side” (Washington 1796).  
In conclusion, the United States relies on alliances to protect itself in the modern world. The 
world is no longer as isolated as it was in Washington’s time and landing troops on foreign soil is 
easier than ever. To counteract the potential dangers of an invasion at home, alliances can isolate 
the fighting to the immediate region of the belligerent, thus keeping the civilian infrastructure, 
economy and population safe from harm. In many ways, however, Washington’s warnings still 
possess merit when questioning alliances and their persistent nature. Troubles within larger 
alliances, such as NATO in regards to Turkey, can lead to problems in the wider security of the 
nation and threaten the security of the United States. Furthermore, the disregard of Washington’s 
ideals in maintaining good relations with other nations and not favouring one or the other has led 
to increased tensions throughout history. This side of the Address was blatantly disregarded 
during the Cold War, and today as United States has set up rivalries across the world. By not 
following Washington’s advice, and by choosing partners to work with while dismissing others 
as rivals has led to significant tensions globally, thus threatening national security.  
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6.3. Commerce as a means of foreign interference 
“But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand: 
neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; […] diffusing and 
diversifying by gentle streams of commerce but forcing nothing […]” 
(Washington 1796). 
Washington’s ideal for trade was American neutrality and liberty to trade with anyone they 
pleased. In his Farewell Address, he called for United States commercial policy to hold “an equal 
and impartial hand,” and wished to prevent showing favouritism to one party or another as “it is 
folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another” (Washington 1796). Through 
the Address, Washington spoke against excessive flattering of another nation, and showing 
preference to them, especially one that showed disinterest in their affairs as it could create 
dissent in others; but also warned the nation from becoming indebted to another, which could 
have the unfortunate effect of leaving them their subject. 
Washington was not alone in his opinion to maintain impartiality in trade. His secretary of 
treasury, Alexander Hamilton with his Federalist party, saw it a source of revenue for the young 
republic (Wood 2009: 101—2), with which the United States could pay off its foreign debts and 
begin a grand scheme to become truly independent of other nations. They had no intention of 
setting protectionist measures, like embargoes or high tariffs, to encourage American production 
over that of foreign production, as any preference shown through them could damage the 
American reputation (Irwin & Sylla 2011: 105; 108). However, the rest of the world was not 
quite so willing to follow America’s example (Irwin & Sylla 2011: 91). 
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After the revolution, Britain was not on terms with the United States and had limited access to its 
markets, especially in the all important West Indies, one of United States’ most prominent 
trading partners at the time. Before the Constitutional Convention of 1787, which would allow 
the federal government to dictate taxes and tariffs (Irwin & Sylla 2011: 89), each individual state 
was in control of its own taxation and commerce (p. 94). Some states attempted to pressure 
Britain into easing access to their markets in the West Indies by banning ships from unloading, 
or by instilling tariffs on the goods coming from abroad, or from other states. These measures 
proved to be ineffective in handling the problem of protectionism, as the states competed not just 
with the foreign entities, but with each other. This disunity allowed foreign shipping to select a 
port to which they landed their goods, leaving those states attempting to combat this market 
inequality practically disabled, unable to continue their efforts for long in the absence of revenue 
and imports (Irwin & Sylla 2011: 93—4). 
After the Constitution’s ratification, a better plan was introduced, which allowed the United 
States to create a coherent and successful commercial strategy (Irwin & Sylla 2011: 98—100). 
Through trade, the federal government gained a source of revenue, which allowed the nation to 
gain strength while at peace. When the conflict between Britain and France started, United States 
was placed into a difficult situation: it had to choose between its most important local trading 
partner, and with its established treaties with France. The Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793 was 
to avoid conflict with either side and assure them that the United States would not interfere in the 
war (Irwin & Sylla 2011: 109—10). Nonetheless, both belligerents began confiscating goods 
aboard American ships (Bemis 1934: 251): this attempt to deny the enemy of foreign goods has 
been a repeated strategy to coerce another nation, and is itself a means of using commerce as a 
tool for influencing a foreign government (and will be discussed further in section 8.3).  
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More importantly, political efforts by Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists, seeking to detach 
United States from the French alliance (Bemis 1934: 251—2; DeConde 1957: 641), sought a 
separate deal with Britain that would alleviate tensions between the two nations and increase 
business opportunities throughout the West Indies (Ferling 1988: 456). This mission, led by John 
Jay and concluding in the signing of the Jay Treaty (prior to Hamilton’s draft of the Address), 
created higher tensions between France and the United States. This show of preference toward 
the British, then, caused exactly what Washington warned of in his Farewell Address: it led to 
conflict with their former ally, as the French retaliated against all American shipping, 
confiscating British goods without any regard to previous treaties and ties.  
A nation choosing to focus on their own personal welfare is not itself surprising; its foreign 
policy and commercial outreach always seeks to negotiate between the cost and the benefit of an 
action. This way of thinking is supported by Milner, Rosendorff and Mansfield (2004), who note 
that there is an inherent quality of domestic and foreign policy always involved in international 
trade. A nation will always take into consideration the domestic effects of a treaty, as well as its 
foreign implications, then evaluate its benefits over its potential costs. In accepting the Jay 
Treaty, a possible domestic instability by those in support of the French alliance was taken into 
consideration, however it was deemed to of lesser importance than a stable business relationship 
with Britain that could secure the financial future of the young republic (Irwin & Sylla 2011: 
118).  
Later in history, United States would find itself in similar situations: put in front of a decision 
between free trade and political necessities; showing preference to one side above that of the 
other. Such moments can be found from both world wars, during which United States found 
itself aligned more with Great Britain and the entente over Germany and the Axis. During World 
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War I, United States had its supply ships attacked, which led to them eventually joining the war 
(Grant 2012). This was not before they had already conceded to Great Britain in the delivery of 
supplies to Germany: Germany was heavily dependent on food imports to sustain themselves, 
and thus United States compliance with a British embargo led to the death of thousands, 
damaging the German war effort. Similarly, in World War II, United States took a stance to aid 
the Allied forces, even before they were themselves drawn into the war in 1941, through the 
lend-lease program12. 
In conclusion, Washington’s ideals for trade, it being neutral and disconnected from turmoil of 
war, were very much idealistic. Even before the formal Farewell Address was delivered, 
Washington had experienced the troubles that international relations and foreign wars had with 
commerce. The Jay Treaty, whose effects materialized only after the Farewell Address had been 
delivered, proved the impossibility of truly neutral shipping, especially in times of war. 
Furthermore, United States would find it impossible to declare themselves neutral in large 
conflicts which effected its trade significantly, mainly due to external factors like embargoes and 
ship seizures. At these times, worries for its own security often placed them on one side or the 
other, which then led to partisan trade accommodation, such as embargoes and the lend-lease 
program. 
  
                                                 
12 An Act to Promote the Defence of the United States, as it was formally known, was a means by which the United 
States sought to protect itself by supplying the Allied nations with supplies, thus complying to Milner, Rosendorff 




7. Earlier interpretations of Washington’s address 
As Washington is a large character in the United States politics, his word has been examined 
many times over. Such is the case with the Farewell Address, which has received readings in 
front of the Senate many times over the years. First official reading of the address occurred in 
1862 during the height of the Civil War to boost morale and strengthen the ideals of unity and 
American character that Washington so deeply represents. Second reading occurred in 1888, on 
the centennial of the Constitution ratification, and two more readings occurred before the event 
turned into an annual session in front of the Senate in 1896, the centennial of the publication of 
Washington’s Farewell Address, always held in late February, around the anniversary of 
Washington’s birth. (Gaffey 2015: 162; U.S. Senate).13  
These readings have, since the later half of the 20th century, often included a more personal note 
from the reader, which expresses their own opinions with the address’ main point that most 
resonates with them. This section will examine some of those notes and see which of 
Washington’s ideas struck these senators. The purpose is to show that there are multiple ways in 
which the words can be interpreted, and that there are many moments throughout United States 
history that Washington’s warnings realize themselves. 
The data is available from the U.S. Senate (U.S. Senate), contained within images of the personal 
notes themselves. These were written by hand and then photographed, and thus all the following 
clear-text transcriptions are my own. The R and D within parenthesis inform the reader of the 
political allegiance of the person discussed, R being Republican and D a Democrat. 
                                                 
13 Archived recordings of these readings can be found from the U.S. Senate website: https://www.senate.gov/floor/.  
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Margaret Chase Smith (R), 1949: 
“[Illegible] President Buckley honored me in asking me to read Washington’s Farewell address. 
[Once] I read this I wondered what our great President would think if he were alive today. Would 
he condemn the proposed North Atlantic Pact as an entangling alliance? The objective in the 
arms treaty—freedom. The only difference is the way to obtain that freedom.” (U.S Senate). 
Senator Smith’s writings point to Washington’s questions about international alliances and the 
contemporary issue about the formation of the North Atlantic Pact. While Washington’s 
Farewell Address advices against alliances, it does make an exception for extreme 
circumstances. Since Senator Smith writes in the wake of World War II, when the Soviet threat 
became entrenched in the post-war continent, it is a question of importance whether or not the 
threat of Soviet Union is large enough for the country to form an entangled alliance within 
Europe through the North Atlantic Pact, more commonly known under the organization that 
implements the pact: NATO. 
In this brief message, she makes a defence for its formation: the acquisition of freedom. 
Similarly to events during the Revolution, which led to the formation of the treaty with France in 
1778, she argues that freedom is an extreme cause that warrants the formation of an alliance. 
United States, however, is not subject to anyone at the time, nor are they involved in a war on 
their own continent. While this mission to obtain freedom could be extended to European nations 
under threat of invasion by the powerful Soviet Union, and perhaps the protection of 
international trade, United States would effectively determine to show preference to nations not 
under the Soviet Union’s control. All of these would lead to United States no longer being a 
neutral country, an integral proposition of the Farewell Address.   
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John McCain III (R), 1987: 
“It is an honor and privilege for me, according to custom, to have conveyed George 
Washington’s Farewell Address to the United States Senate and to the people of this nation. 
In this stressful time when once again the confidence of the people in their institution is being 
severly [sic] threatened, I believe it is entirely fitting to reflect on General Washington’s 
emphasis on morality in government. Closer adherence to his words is the surest path to a 
restored institution of the presidency and a renewal of faith of the American people in their 
system of government.” 
First year senator, McCain strikes a rather different note than others. His reading came at a 
turbulent time for the Reagan administration, with the emergence of weapons trade with Iran in 
1986, with whom the United States was not allowed to trade arms with due to an arms embargo. 
The Tower Commission, which was an inquiry into the matter led by former Senator John 
Tower, was very critical of the Reagan administration and found them having used 
intermediaries and contras, rebel groups funded and supplied by the U.S., in their combatting of 
threats against the U.S., to supply weapons to Iran. The report was published mere eleven days 
after Senator McCain’s reading, and multiple Congressional investigations had been launched to 
examine the matter by then. (Tower, Muskie & Snowcroft: 1987).  
In the note left behind by McCain, he speaks of national unity, the need to rely on a strong, 
central government to lead a unified American people. His words echo many of the others 
examined in this section, speaking of the honor that comes reading the address, and of the 
wisdom in the founding father. They diverge, however, in the manner in which they attack the 
sitting President. His words about the “surest path to restored institution of the presidency” speak 
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of the disappointment that he had for the current administration, and how he saw Washington’s 
tendency toward neutrality, presented within the Address through warnings against preference 
and entanglements, as an example of how the administration should be operated. 
John Breaux (D), 2004: 
“What a great honor to have read George Washington’s farewell address to the full Senate. My 
thoughts as I read his speech were that after over 200 years of government how approiate [sic] 
they were today. His warning of the possibilities of political parties losing sight of their real 
purpose is still true today[.] His concern about becoming too involved in the affairs of other 
nations strike an important note in today’s World! Washington’s world was much smaller than 
our world today. We are all more dependant on each other for peace + prosperity. I think 
Washington would be proud of America today as he was in 1796 A.D.” 
John Breaux’s 2004 note on the Farewell Address combines many of the points structured by 
Washington, the least of which is Washington’s insistence upon the importance of religion in 
using “A.D.” at the very end. He notes how political parties are losing their “real purpose,” a 
sign of how there may be a rise in individual power within the party that raises the spirit of party 
to commit to actions dangerous to public safety. This can be correlated with the following 
sentence, in which he warns from getting too involved in the business of other nations (it is 
important to note that this was written after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and during an election 
year). These reveal a worrisome sign within the internal organization of the Democratic Party at 
the time: in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the United States, the country voted to 
go to war, with a portion of the Democrats voting for war, while a majority voted against it. 
While Muirhead (2011: 719) and logic says that this unified response against a perceived 
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aggravator is common, it shows a sudden loss of ethical partisanship in the discussion due to the 
emotions caused by the attacks. As such, similar loss of objective opinion can explain other 
events in the past, like opinion within the United States turning toward the option of war in the 
case of War of 1812 and World War I. Breaux’s notion, then, is a question of party spirit, and 
whether or not it is bad for the country.  
Further on, Breaux contests Washington’s ideas of maintaining strictly non-preferential 
treatment of other countries in trade, and that the United States should not become reliant on 
other nations. With this, Breaux breaks from the norm by defending the United States’ need of 
other nations as they bring both peace and prosperity to the nation. His defence for this stance is 
the interconnected nature of the world now than it had been in the age of sail. It is true that 
commerce has connected the world and countries operate either under commercial treaties or the 
World Trade Organization rules. Most nations are also reliant on imports for food or fuel (much 
like Germany was in World War I), without which the nation would suffer famines and shortages 
as they were unable to sustain themselves due to lack of natural resources. This, then, would be 
proof enough to Breaux that nations were dependent on one another.  
Kelly Ayotte (R), 2013: 
“President Washington’s Farewell Address is a testament to the strength, wisdom, and humility 
of the first president. With a deep sense of reverence, I was honored to carry on this special 
Senate tradition. 
As senators gather to make decision about our country’s future, Washington’s warnings about 
accumulating debt remain especially relevant. Preserving our national credit remains essential to 
our safety and security – and as Washington wrote, we ought not to pass in to posterity, “the 
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burden” which we ourselves ought to bear, I pray we will have the courage to meet that 
challenge.  
May God bless our great country – Live Free or Die! Kelly Ayotte” 
Lastly, I wish to look at the most recent addition to the notebook. After this, there do not appear 
to be any records of further notes written in the notebook, though readers have continued to 
appear before the Senate since 2013. This note, along with some of the other more recent notes, 
refers to the national debt, and the responsibility of elected officials to ensure the nation is not 
engulfed by over-expenditure and reliance on national credit, which might see the nation 
overtaken by its enemies. Washington’s Farewell Address speaks about the debt in connection to 
national security, and suggest that the government takes actions “cultivating peace” and 
“shunning expenses” (Washington 1796). 
One view of these words could be that money should be spent on defence to avoid a position of 
disadvantage. Where the nation would have to build its army on the spot, instead of having a 
prepared, trained military to repel an enemy at the ready, which was a direction toward which 
Washington was developing the ragtag group of militiamen under his command during the 
Revolution. Whether it be by discouraging the enemy from attacking, or simply being able to 
swiftly put an end to a war before the expenses could overwhelm the national credit. 
Another view, however, is that public credit is that of trust. That by credit Washington refers to 
the people. It was a struggle in the early parts of the revolution for Washington to maintain an 
army. After Battle of Bunker Hill, and the subsequent winter during which Washington 
restructured the army, he also lost many of the New Englanders that formed the army as they had 
to return home to their fields and lives. (Ferling 1988: 136—38). It is his experiences as a soldier 
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that can provide some insight into Washington’s understanding of duty and the requirement of 
public attitude for the function of a nation, especially one at war. It was this public attitude that 
influenced Washington’s decision making, and which would come to affect decision making 
throughout American history–one strong example is the loss of public support for the war in 
Vietnam, while not determining the outcome of the war, helped necessitate the negotiations that 
led to peace (Grant 2012: 358). Though it is important to note that it was not the support for the 
war that was ever questioned, as majority always appeared to be pro, it was liable for rapid and 
radical changes (Grant 2012: 359), and as such an internal issue for the sitting President and their 
party. Therefore, it was “public credit,” not in the sense of wealth, but political support that 
Washington may have feared might fracture, or destabilize the country. Similarly one can see 
these ideas come to life in Senator McCain’s discussion about the morality of government and 
the need to restore the institutions therein.  
All in all, the notes left behind by Senators were revering. They spoke highly of the “honor” that 
it was to read his words in front of the Senate. This was to be expected, but nevertheless the 
discussion it provided clarified the broad range to whom Washington spoke, and of the timeless 
nature of his warnings. It also made it evident that not always has United States listened to the 
First President and his ideas for the nation, as they did in the first century and a half, when 
United States opted for an isolationist approach in their foreign policy, though this is not because 
of Washington’s policies, rather due to the interpretations of his legacy and strategies as the First 
President. Senator Breaux’s dismissal of Washington’s ideas about remaining independent from 
the rest of the world also struck a notable difference in idealism between 1940s and 2000s, and 





8.1. Slander and lies: Case of James Callender and speech as a democratic process 
While Washington’s Farewell Address spoke about the party spirit, its nature and its effects on 
society, the message lacked practical examples of how it may manifest beyond party dissention. 
Indeed, he mentioned the “spirit of innovation,” whose “assault may be to effect in the forms of 
the Constitution alterations which will impair the energy of the system and thus to undermine 
what cannot be directly overthrown.” This spirit of innovation could be considered regulations 
which seek to discriminate or dissuade votership, but also attacks against the fundamental rights 
stated in the Constitution. One such right is presented in the First Amendment (U.S. Const., 
amend. 1), in which “Congress shall make no law … prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” 
It would not be long after Washington left office that the first such law was established: the 
Sedition Act of 1798 (History, Art & Archives), sought to exhaust “false, scandalous and 
malicious writing” (Sedition Act of 1798 s. 2) against the government and its leadership. It was 
argued to be a measure with which to prevent potentially hostile entities from generating chaos, 
should the newly formed United States be drawn into war against the French, among their 
majorly French-aligned countrymen. 
Judge Alexander Addison was a proponent of the Act (Rosenberg 1984) and would support it for 
years. He was an ardent defender to setting limits to what was legally authorized to be said about 
a nation and its government, with limitations to the authority of the government, naturally, to 
challenge what was considered libel. This was achieved by giving jurisdiction “before any court 
of the United States” (Sedition Act of 1798 s. 2), meaning that the judges and the jury held 
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authority over determining if something was libel or not (Wood 2009: 260), instead of the 
government. Addison’s defence, then came in the form of protecting people’s rights to determine 
the truth, and to diminish the quantity of falsehoods that spread in the politically hostile 
environment in which all sides sought to discredit the other.  
The Sedition Act, however, failed to gain spirit. While it was passed into law in 1798, it was 
decreed to last until 1801, unless expanded upon. When opponent of the bill, Thomas Jefferson 
became president in 1800, the bill was never renewed and it expired in March of 1801 (Sedition 
Act of 1798 s. 4; Wood 2009: 260). While the bill was in force only for a brief amount of time, 
leading to the indictment of fourteen people under the Act, of which ten were penalized (Wood 
2009: 260), it functionally achieved to realize all Washington’s warnings of a single party 
dominion. It defeated the criticism of elected bodies, and that of government; allowed for a 
singular party opinion to rule unchallenged; and it promoted sectionalism amongst the political 
parties, dissuading the two sides from reaching for compromise. For this section, then, I will 
examine the Sedition Act in practice by studying the case of James Callender, who was 
convicted under it. In this brief examination I will highlight how counterproductive subduing 
political discord can be, as the discrimination shown through it may raise defenders amongst 
those that support speech as a democratic process. 
Consider the case of James Callender, a man whose opinions had raised plenty of ire in the 
political leadership of the nation in the years leading to the Sedition Act (Wood 2009: 237). The 
case overall was seen, even at the time, as a deeply partisan attack against Jeffersonian party 
promoters, and those that used their papers to “violate the laws of our country” (see Smith 1954: 
182). The case against Callender consisted of multiple passages from a paper released by James 
Callender titled The Prospect Before Us. He was charged for libel and sedition against President 
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Adams, whom he criticized heavily in his paper. The trial concluded in Callender’s 
imprisonment until the expiration of the Sedition Act, but it would not silence him. He wrote 
multiple additions to his earlier publications, and wrote passages that would, considering the 
nature of the passages he was convicted upon, most likely have put him in trial once more. 
The trial in itself was a deeply disturbing affair from a modern standpoint. Judge Chase14, a 
Supreme Court Justice, took on the case himself and presided over the case in Virginia. His 
motive for this cannot be accurately questioned, which may have ranged from a partisan view to 
enforcing Federal law in the Southern states (of which Virginia had voted against certifying the 
Sedition Act into law). Whatever the case, it was evident that the jurors in the case, whom Judge 
Chase declined multiple pleas to replace, consisted of Federalists and political opponents of 
Callender (Smith 1954: 171). He also continuously interrupted the defence, and declined their 
witnesses (Wood 2009: 261). The prosecution also acted vehemently against the defence, taking 
on a doctrine of “guilty until proved innocent” (Smith 1954: 172). 
It did not help Callender’s cause that he was a foreigner, and not a born American, as Judge 
Chase was eager to make apparent when sentencing him. He was a naturalized citizen, but born 
in Britain where he had been outlawed after similarly stinging statements against the state (Smith 
1954: 158). In the end, he was sentenced to nine months in jail and to a fine of two hundred 
dollars (Wood 2009: 261). Today, Judge Chase’s treatment of Callender due to his place of birth 
is a clear sign of discrimination, and thus a way in which his party spirit attempted to stifle the 
voice of opposition.  
                                                 
14 Justice Samuel Chase was later impeached for his potentially partisan behaviour, however he was acquitted by the 




While the Sedition Act tried to reduce quantity of falsehoods and accusations of false nature 
against elected officials, it failed to account for the definition of libel. Prosecutor of the 
Callender case, Nelson, spoke of a person’s rights to “expatiate on the virtues of the new 
candidate;” he also stated it “false, scandalous, and malicious” to consider the potentiality of war 
with France should Adams be re-elected in 1800, and stated it untrue on the basis of its 
predictive quality (Smith 1954: 175). This prevention of argumentation of possibilities covers all 
ground of hypotheticals of negative stature, when questioning the actions of an elected official. 
As such, what would not be considered libel, or untrue, if matters that are not even real cannot be 
claimed to be free of this definition? 
In the aftermath of the sedition trials, the Federalists realized they had only increased the 
criticism of their political ideologies, but also created a fervent demand for a press that criticised 
politicians and the parties (Wood 2009: 262). This network helped the Republicans to focus their 
national agenda, unify the nation under their own ideals, and separate them from the Federalist 
agenda, allowing for a sweeping victory in 1800 (Wood 2009: 308). In response to this success, 
the Federalists in 1801 launched their own papers that sought to captivate the public opinion and 
counteract Republican ideas, effectively committing the same acts which they had sought to 
suppress in the past few years. 
In seeking to dissuade from critical speech of the government, they had in fact only succeeded in 
detaching their ideology from their opponents and defining a clearer outline between the two. 
Through the Sedition Act and discrimination of their opponents, such as James Callender, the 
Federalists had damaged the democratic process. This push against speech, then, and against a 
fundamental right within the Constitution, turned those in favour of ethical partisanship toward 
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the side in which freedoms and the democratic process were defended (as was discussed in 
section 6.1). 
Similar developments can be seen in modern day with the rise of political commentary known as 
fake news and alternative facts, which function to deliver false information through 
sensationalist topics (Levush 2019). These modern publications follow similar patterns to the 
articles that led to the sedition trials, and face a threat of censorship online, and the application of 
defamation laws that attempt to stifle those accused of delivering disinformation in this form 
(Levush 2019: 1). This conflict of disinformation is best highlighted around election times, 
which in the 2020 presidential elections culminated in the disputes around election fraud. These 
claims were supported by the chief executive Donald Trump in a tweet: “changes made to the 
voting process, rules and regulations, many made hastily before the election and therefore the 
whole State Election is not legal or Constitutional” (Trump  2021). These facts themselves were 
at first disputed through tags, such as “This claim about election fraud is disputed,” but the tweet 
was eventually removed along with the account. Others that made similar claims have been 
attacked through civil lawsuits (like that of US Dominion Inc. v. Rudolph Giuliani), which has 
raised question over the publication of disinformation on online platforms. 
The draconian law under which Callender was sentenced raised opposition against it, both from 
Callender and others, and eventually led to a political shift that ended the law. While 
disinformation today is combatted in less unsettling manner, and through civil lawsuits rather 
than a criminal ones, it provokes a thought of what opposition against this form of information 
control can cause. Much like the events surrounding the Sedition Act raised opposition against 
the law, partisan opinions (of those that use disinformation) may rise against the laws that seek to 
stifle disinformation and demand the dismissal of the regulations on speech.  
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8.2. American identity: Reaction of an isolationist nation in defence of its people 
“Citizens by birth or choice, of a common country, that country has a right to 
concentrate your affections. The name of American, which belongs to you, in 
your national capacity must always exalt the just pride of patriotism more than 
any appellation derived from local discriminations” (Washington 1796). 
The Farewell Address was an important document for the American people and the country as a 
whole. Through it, Washington is often referred to as one of the founders of the isolationist 
policies that followed his terms in office (Nordlinger 2001). The document, however, is equally 
important as evidence to the foundation of the American identity and the term American. It 
answers the question what it means to be American, but also what duty is bound to them as 
citizens of the new Republic, and vice versa. In this section, I will discuss what this identity 
meant for national behaviour, especially in regards to the events surrounding the War of 1812, 
and in the isolationist policy that was broken during the war for the purpose of defending the 
citizenry of the United States.  
Isolationism as a policy is the abstention of a state from foreign relations, of political alliances 
and economic treaties with other countries, to better focus on domestic affairs and to remain 
uninvolved with potential hostilities with foreign states. While the Farewell Address indeed calls 
for such action, Wright (1943: 175) argues that these were measures Washington wished to 
propose in order to defend the country during its early years. He makes the point that 
Washington did not consider these matters beyond the next few decades, as he knew how much 
time could change a country and how change may be a necessary reaction to issues that may 
arise (e.g. necessity for the Constitutional Convention of 1787). The fledgling nation at this early 
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time was still unstable and its people divided into factions that were vulnerable to foreign 
influence. Once the domestic issues were resolved, and the nation unified under a single identity, 
the country could open itself for further experimentation (Wright 1943: 176). Isolationism, then, 
was not an unreasonable policy in the early Republic: it ensured the nation’s survival into the 
next century, during which its domestic affairs stabilized and they became an identifiable entity 
from European nations with its own characterization as American. (Wright 1943).  
The way in which Washington spoke of the identity a citizen was through the nation they 
belonged to, and through its sovereignty. To Washington, a citizen’s identity was integral to their 
loyalty toward the country and its other citizens, no matter their origin. Through this view, 
Washington not only sought unity amongst the peoples of the United States, but defence of the 
republican ideals that connected them. This duty by citizens and to citizens, and their liberty as 
ordered under the Constitution, then, is what I will argue is the source of American identity. This 
is best highlighted by the War of 1812, which showed United States break free from its 
isolationism to, not only fight for the recognition of their independence, but to protect its citizens 
from the presumed authority of the British (Wood 2009: 659—700).  
The War of 1812 was part of the overall conflict of the Napoleonic Wars, though to the United 
States the reasons for going to war with Britain had nothing to do with Napoleon’s conflict. The 
War of 1812 was in a way a second war for independence (Wood 2009: 669). Even after the 
1783 Treaty of Paris, which saw the end of the American Revolution and recognition by the 
British government, and the Jay Treaty, which sought to secure American trade and neutrality, 
the British navy was still forcing American citizens to serve15 by capturing them in American 
                                                 
15 Impressment was a means for a navy to supplement casualties during a war, and the British were in constant need 
of sailors during the turn of the century due to their war with France. 
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ports and vessels. This meant that American citizens, through mistakes, misunderstandings and 
negligence, were forced to serve aboard British ships. Furthermore, as the British had control of 
major portions of the Atlantic throughout this time in history, they were able to easily manage 
the United States trade network and prevent them from operating truly independently, or at all, 
preventing any attempts by the United States to remain neutral. (Bemis 1934: 251—2; Wood 
2009: 641—2; 662—7).  
The United States entered the conflict with multiple war goals. Primarily they sought to force the 
British into compliance with the Treaty of Paris and acknowledge their rights as a sovereign 
nation, but other war goals included an end to the Native American threat that existed in their 
frontier: this meant that they needed to invade British Canada whose support for local natives 
threatened American expansion. Furthermore, smuggling from Canada had helped undermine 
attempts by the United States to fight the British economic restrictions, which may have made 
the target more appealing to Federal government. 
An over-reliance upon American-born citizens of Canada, whom they had expected to aid them 
in the invasion due to their presumed loyalties, made it appear easier than it was. The first 
invasion of British Canada ended in failure, as did all subsequent attempts (Wood 2009: 680), 
though the war in general was met with initial successes, especially in the fight against the 
natives. Andrew Jackson (who would later become the 7th President of Unites States), succeeded 
in defeating the natives in the South (Wood 2009: 687—8). However, as the war went on and the 
British navy mobilized, and Canada stood firm against United States forces, it quickly turned 
into a war of attrition (Wood 2009: 688—90). In late 1814 peace was certain: the United States 
navy was kept in harbour by the British navy and the nation was bankrupt due to the lack of 
revenue from trade (Wood 2009: 692). The War ended in the restoration of the status quo in 
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December 1814 and was received in the United States in early 1815, but only after Andrew 
Jackson recorded a major victory over the British in January 1815 in New Orleans (Wood 2009: 
695—6). 
The peace treaty did not acknowledge any secessions of land, nor acknowledgements of 
neutrality or discontinuation of impressment of US citizens. It did not matter, however, as it 
proved to the world that the United States was able, and willing to defend its rights and its 
citizens from foreign transgressions. It did so, willing to break away from a tradition of non-
involvement. To the American identity, the War of 1812 brought about a unity that had not been 
achieved in the previous decades, as there was no argument over fighting for another nation, but 
for their own. (Wood 2009; Grant 2012).  
Moreover, the War of 1812 cannot be measured by the peace treaty, as the war ended due to 
difficulties on both sides to practically challenge the other. The British were engaged in a war 
with France, and could not afford the expense and troops to fight the Americans, who had no 
practical way of assaulting Britain itself. Therefore, it is more pertinent to look at the changes the 
war caused in the national character, and cultural works produced through it. The lyrics of the 
United States’ national anthem The Star-Spangled Banner, for instance, originate from a poem 
written during the War of 1812 (Wood 2009: 691), and art depicted victories in the war, such as 
the USS Constitution Battles HMS Guerriere (1812) by Michel Felice Cornè (1752–1845). 
Furthermore, the United States gained a new national focus to protect trade and its liberties with 
this newly established navy. In 1815, it went to war with Algiers and the Barbary States to end 
their piracy of American ships and to free American (and other) prisoners (Wood 2009: 696—
700), showing that United States was willing to extend its reach beyond its borders for the sake 
of security for its citizens and their rightful operations. 
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8.3.Commerce as a successful foreign policy 
Section 6.3 discussed Washington’s ideas of trade and how it was a factor in national behaviour 
toward another country, and a representation of a country’s stance toward another. This section 
will discuss deeper the use of commercial strategies as a tool to incentivize a nation to follow a 
specific pathway in its domestic or foreign policy, through the management of sanctions, 
embargoes, or foreign aid, to see if there was wisdom in Washington’s warnings that commerce 
should not be used to enforce or encroach upon a nation’s sovereign policy. 
When Hamilton in late 1793 released a congressional report establishing the significant barriers 
to trade in many ports, especially ones controlled by Britain, action was called for. Jefferson 
wished to sanction those countries preventing imports (mainly Britain), but Hamilton disagreed, 
finding the acts unnecessarily hostile and impractical due to the diversity and importance of 
British imports to national revenue and welfare. Any attempts to raise the issue were rebuffed by 
Washington and the Federalists until 1805, when the Jay Treaty, failing to be renegotiated, 
expired and the Republicans (now holding the presidency) were allowed to act. The Republicans 
introduced an embargo on all shipping in 1807, the intent being a peaceful coercion to end the 
impressment of American sailors and to enforce neutrality on all American shipping. This plan 
failed, and though it had little effect on the finances of the United States, it showed minimal 
success of such an approach, even to a nation that relied heavily on United States shipping while 
fighting a war. (Irwin & Sylla 2011: 112, 116; Wood 2009: 646—7). 
Similar strategy of coercion was used by Britain during the world wars, in which they sought to 
disable Germany’s ability to fight, causing catastrophic damage to the nation’s finances and 
welfare (Berghoff, Logemann & Romer 2017; Startt 2017: 41—2). Mainly in the First World 
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War, Britain began a blockade that prevented United States’ (neutral at this stage of the war) 
ships from delivering goods to German ports and those of other neutral nations through which it 
could be delivered to Germany (Startt 2017: 41). This pushed United States clearly out of its 
neutral stance, as its “arms trade could only benefit the Allies and was, therefore, in violation of 
the spirit of neutrality” (Startt 2017: 44). As such, it would suggest that Britain was able to 
successfully manipulate United States foreign policy toward a favourable direction through the 
blockade of Germany. While efforts to counteract this behaviour were taken by the United 
States, Germany’s own efforts to prevent goods from aiding Britain caused opposition to rise 
within the United States against the Central Powers (Startt 2017: 33; 114). Therefore, it may not 
have been Britain’s commercial strategy that successfully changed United States’ position on 
Germany and the war, but merely increased the likelihood of conflict due to the American deaths 
caused by Germany, and United States’ national character to protect its citizens from undue harm 
(as was discussed in section 8.2).  
Finally, I would like to discuss Iran, which has been a scene for economic sanctions since the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979. United States strategy is to “cease supporting acts of terrorism and 
to limit Iran’s strategic power in the Middle East” (Katzman 2021: 1). In the third millennia, 
sanctions have heavily focused on limiting Iran’s nuclear program, but maintained efforts 
elsewhere. In 2015, Iran signed a treaty that limited their attempts to refine nuclear materials, 
lifting many of the sanctions while keeping in place sanctions against the importation of 
armaments, including components for missile development. This treaty was rescinded 
unilaterally by the United States in 2018 in attempts to renegotiate the treaty through applying 
pressure on the Iranian economic sector. 
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Katzman (2021: 50) notes that the global economic sanctions in place prior to 2015 were 
instrumental in achieving the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). 
Through cooperation of the United States, European Union and their allies, Iran was willing to 
limit its nuclear program in exchange for lifting the sanctions on oil, precious metals and other 
major markets. After United States withdrawal from the treaty, the European Union did not 
reintroduce sanctions against Iran in the markets it had already lifted, in attempts to salvage the 
treaty. However, many private companies opted to limit or abandon the Iranian market due to 
pressure from the United States. (Katzman 2021: 43—4). 
In the end, the sanctions have had little effect on Iran’s behaviour. Prior to the JCPOA, Iran 
funded operations in the region and have continued to do so since. Their weapons development 
program has not seen a significant increase or a decrease within the timeframe, and at least since 
2018, Iran has been successful in developing advancements in its nuclear and domestic weapon’s 
development. Some unrest has evolved in Iran, however they appear to be unconnected to the 
Unites States’ sanctions. They have neither shown a decrease in Iran’s foreign involvement, as 
can be seen from their continued funding of regional forces, though there is a change in their 
focus now that the situation in Syria has calmed. Politically the environment within Iran has 
continued to oppose the United States and elections are estimated to support existing powers. 
(Katzman 2021: 50—3).  
Part of the reason why the sanction may have failed could be that Iran did not have time to 
become dependent upon the global economic system between 2015—2018. Furthermore, it 
already possessed a robust marketplace that is able to sustain itself in lieu of foreign investment. 
As for its weapon development, it has not needed United States approval since the change in 
regime in late-70s, and the extensive weapons bans that have existed since the 90s. Therefore 
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domestic replication of weapons has had major support in the country’s political environment as 
purchasing them became difficult elsewhere. 
United States sanctions, then, have not seemingly had any effect in Iran’s conduct. While it has 
had significant effect on Iran’s market and economy, it has failed to generate an effect that would 
enforce United States’ will over the country. While some may argue that European Union 
resistance to join these sanctions has led to their failure, looking at Katzman’s (2021: 52—3) 
dissection of the economic effects shows that the levels have dropped to levels similar as prior to 
the JCPOA. This is most likely due to pressure on private businesses and countries more 
dependant upon United States foreign aid. As Milner, Rosendorff and Mansfield (2004) discuss, 
foreign aid as a means of foreign influencing can be more productive than outright denial of 
trade: if a nation is dependant upon another nation for aid, they are more easily converted to a 
secondary point of view. Applying this ideology to a successful operation, in which a foreign 
nation subverted hostile opinions from forming, this would appear to be the case. The Marshall 
Plan, which the United States started as a means of economic recovery for the war torn European 
states, successfully prevented multiple nations from falling into the sphere of communism (Grant 
2012: 329). 
In conclusion, while trade alone as a means of foreign influencing failed on multiple accounts to 
change the opinions present within a nation, it would appear that there is some merit in applying 
economic pressure through foreign aid. This would also abide by Washington’s warnings that 
forceful behaviour or showing preference, as is often done in war, tends to lead to conflict, 
whereas investment on a nation, or “diffusing and diversifying by gentle streams of commerce” 




Throughout this thesis I have discussed aspects of the Farewell Address and how they reveal 
themselves throughout history. Much of the discussion revolved around the time of 
Washington’s presidency to the end of the War of 1812, but some of the parallels and the events 
surrounding them are still unfolding. This only proves that the subjects discussed in this thesis 
are still pertinent today 
Section 5.1 discussed the origins of the Farewell Address and the ideas presented by 
Washington, and whether they were truly his. Alexander Hamilton played a major part in the 
construction of the Address, but concluded that the words were Washington’s own. This is 
eventually proven by the subtle changes that occur between Hamilton’s draft and the published 
work, which also highlights the differences between the two characters: Hamilton possessed 
more radical views to those of Washington, whose ideas were more lenient of party opinion. The 
sections show that the Farewell Address contains a message that Washington approved of, 
conveying his ideas and policy and what the nation should be wary of in acting its force. 
Party spirit, as Washington called it, is a means by which a partisan opinion is radicalized and 
their power enacted. This may take its form as revenge or discrimination, but also as a means of 
expressing their opinion on contested subjects. In the case of James Callender and the Sedition 
Act of 1798, party spirit was expressed as both of these, attacking opinions that were not shared 
by the governing party and proposed ideals that threatened the safety of the public. Party spirit is 
not inherently evil, however, nor definitive in nature, as was discussed in section 6.1. Party spirit 
can appear within a party itself, should it lack an opposition to argument against. This may lead 
to fracturing of a party from within through a similar process with which it radicalizes the two 
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sides. It is also a means by which majority opinion can be harnessed and altering opinions raised, 
which is an important aspect of the democratic process, though at times questionable when the 
opinions turn to falsehoods, as was discussed in relation to disinformation and censorship and 
where it may lead.  
In regards to alliances and foreign affairs, Washington sought a neutral, non-committed 
approach. While he acknowledged that the United States could not hope to persist alone, he 
promoted commercial strategies over political ones when dealing with foreign nations. Attempts 
to stabilize the nation were his focus at the time and therefore the troubles of Europe less 
pertinent for the survival of the newly formed Republic. Thus is it not surprising that a pertinent 
voice within his Address was for national unity and the unification of the people, and the 
dismissal of their differences. The interpretation of Washington’s Address as an isolationist 
policy would be accurate, but only as long as it was recognized to be in relation to his attempts to 
stabilize the nation and its peoples.  
When discussing the interpretation of Washington’s warnings, and how they reflect upon 
strategies used in commerce to influence others, it is evident that Washington’s warnings should 
still resonate in the mind of the leader. In section 8.3, it was shown that using forceful strategies 
to bring about change within another nation was not as successful as more peaceful options. The 
discussion around Iran, especially, shows that a country will find it difficult to enact change, if 
they do not have leverage, or anything to offer to the nation. Meanwhile, World War I proved 
that, while a blockade may successfully starve the opponent of supplies, it is also likely to raise 
forceful opposition and thus fail as a peaceful measure. The Marshall Plan, meanwhile, proves 
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